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ABSTRACT 
One of the common lessons learned from the 11 September Terrorist Attacks in 
2001, Southeast Asia Tsunami in 2004 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, was there were 
major command and control (C2) and information challenges during the crisis response 
efforts. The Department of Defense (DoD) is currently transitioning to face these global 
threats of terrorism and natural disasters, as well as support the goals of the new National 
Strategy, by developing new plans and procedures to improve the coordination, 
communications and operations between DoD and other entities when responding 
simultaneously to such complex humanitarian disasters (CHD).  In searching for a mobile 
and adoptable communication solution for military operations, the DoD should consider a 
C2 system that utilizes advanced commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology.  Hastily-
formed networks (HFN) could provide a global broadband network node with internet, 
voice, video and data capability in a rapidly deployable manner, which offer significant 
advantages to military and other crisis response activities.  The focus of this thesis 
concentrates on the financial aspects of HFNs in support of humanitarian assistance 
and/or disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts by U.S. armed forces.  This research and analysis 
of HFNs could present prospective benefits to DoD, which include cost-savings, 
enhanced emergency response capabilities and improved interagency/international 
relations.  Additionally, this study will provide a recommended model methodology and 
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
As we prepare for the future, we must think differently and develop the 
kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges 
and to unexpected circumstances. We must transform not only the 
capabilities at our disposal, but also the way we think, the way we train, 
the way we exercise and the way we fight. We must transform not only 
our armed forces, but also the Department that serves them by 
encouraging a culture of creativity and prudent risk-taking. We must 
promote an entrepreneurial approach to developing military capabilities, 
one that encourages people to be proactive, not reactive, and anticipates 
threats before they emerge.1 
- Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense 
 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the financial aspects of hastily-formed 
networks (HFNs), when utilized as a communications solution for humanitarian 
assistance and/or disaster relief (HA/DR) operations involving U.S. armed forces.  
Additionally, this thesis will provide a recommended model methodology and iterations 
for future military-use of HFNs in support of “transformation,” as defined by the 
Department of Defense (DoD). 
During the relief efforts of the 11 September 2001 Terrorist Attacks (9/11), 
December 2004 Southeast Asia Tsunami and August 2005 Hurricane Katrina, there were 
major command and control (C2) and information challenges for the various multi-
agency responders.  The DoD and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) abroad are 
currently dealing with these challenges to develop new plans and procedures to improve 
the security and communication processes of the United States and their allies. 
Increasingly, National interests are focusing on improvements in coordination, 
communications and operations between the DoD and other entities when responding 
simultaneously to natural or man-made Complex Humanitarian Disasters (CHDs).  
Although there have been tremendous technology advancements, it is still very difficult 
to set up, manage, and interact with networked devices.  An effective HFN could provide 
                                                 
1 Foreword from Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, Transformation Planning Guidance, 
2003. 
2 
a global broadband network node with internet, voice, video and data capability in a 
rapidly deployable manner.  These C2 capabilities easily provide significant advantages 
to military activities, NGOs and the private sector.  A financial analysis of HFNs could 
present prospective benefits to DoD, which include cost-savings, enhanced emergency 
response capabilities and improved interagency/international relations.   
B. BACKGROUND 
Increased terrorist threats and post-9/11 national and international CHDs, appear 
to have had a direct effect on the conduct of our nation.  The fact that many of these 
events are occurring on U.S. soil emphasizes the need for greater awareness, more 
thorough cross communication and significant changes in our National Defense and 
National Military Strategy.  Although C2 and information requirements for DOD and 
NGOs are rapidly changing within this new environment, the utilization of information as 
a strategic resource remains an unchanged requirement.   
As far back as the Revolutionary War, the U.S. military has continued to leverage 
information as a strategic resource.  Advanced information technology (IT) systems have 
improved the way information is communicated.  As U.S. forces decrease in size, there 
will be a need for a higher degree of mobility and sustainability.  Furthermore, the DoD 
must continue exploring the applications and financial implications of IT solutions that 
focus on improving all service branch’s ability to operate as a joint force.  Early 
transformation requires exploiting IT opportunities to reform defense business practices 
and to create new combinations of capabilities, operating concepts, organizational 
relationships and training regimes.2   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to determine whether the concepts of market comparables and KVA can 
be effectively applied to the DoD and its vision of transformation, the following research 
questions need to be answered: 
• What are the financial implications using HFNs in a remote or devastated 
operating area?  
• What benefits can be gained by using the Knowledge Value Analysis 
(KVA) on Hastily-formed Networks (HFNs) in support of Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Operations? 
                                                 
2 Transformation Planning Guidance, United States Department of Defense [US DoD], 2003. 
3 
• How can we use the Market Comparables approach to estimate or 
monetize the revenue component to a similar civilian organization 
(Western wild fires, Hurricane Katrina, etc.)? 
• What are equivalent market comparables for financial implications to the 
DOD/NGO HA/DR functions? 
D. SCOPE 
This thesis will cover the conceptual aspects of the definition and application of 
HFNs in military-use for HA/DR operations.  Through an in-depth research of HFN 
equipment and review of the current industry literature on market comparables and KVA, 
this thesis will integrate the two and determine the benefits of implementing this 
prospective C2 initiative.  Another focus of this research will be developing a model and 
methodology for future HFNs and exploring the funding and implementation process.    
Data will be collected from the Coalition Operating Area Surveillance and 
Targeting System (COASTS) project.  The COASTS project expands the NPS Monterey 
Research and Development (R&D) partnership with Thailand and supports the objectives 
of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), which include Regional Maritime Security, 
Theater Security Cooperation and War on Terror campaign.  Additional data will be 
collected from another commercial IT solution tested during a Homeland Security field 
exercise, involving various multi-agency responders. 
Prospective benefits of this research include the following:  
1. Joint research project 
a. Cost-effectiveness: leveraging both U.S. and Thailand expertise 
and technology  
2. Long-term investment       
a. Systematic and Spiral Development research program 
b. Provisions for future opportunities 
3. Information-sharing among participants 
a. U.S. & Thailand science and technology stimulation  
4. Financial implications in the deployment of HFNs  
a. HA/DR 




The methodology for this thesis research includes the following steps: 
1. Conduct a comprehensive literature search of books, journal articles and 
Internet based materials. 
2. Conduct a comprehensive review of government reports concerning force 
structure initiatives, optimization efforts and DOD Directives regarding 
transformation from a business process perspective. 
3. Conduct necessary interviews to acquire critical insight and understanding 
of current government policy governing the roles of HA/DR. 
4. Develop a model and methodology for future HFNs that will incorporate 
the following: 
a. Market Comparables 
b. KVA application 
c. Scalable limitations 
F. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis research will be organized in the following manner: 
• CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION – consisting of an outline and overview 
of this thesis research, it will include purpose, background, scope, 
methodology and organization. 
• CHAPTER II: HFN TECHNOLOGIES – will consist of a description and 
overview of HFNs, as well as an introduction and overview of HFN 
components and equipment.   
• CHAPTER III: DATA COLLECTION – will consist of data collected 
from three field experiments:  1) COASTS Point Sur testing; 2) COASTS 
Thailand testing; and 3) Homeland Security testing (a comparable C2 
application).   
• CHAPTER IV: FINANCIAL OPPORTUNITIES – will consist of a 
description and overview of the market comparables and KVA concept 
and its potential applications.  This will include a discussion of the 
concept of market comparables and KVA in the context of HA/DR 
operations. Additional data will be findings from the financial 
methodologies, which will include two guidelines business selections and 
KVA calculations. 
• CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS – will consist of the analysis of the data 
collections from Chapter IV.  Further analysis will focus on model 
methodology, prospective implementation, optional iterations and scalable 
limitations.  This is intended to solidify the premise that HFNs can be  
5 
• successfully utilized as a C2 solution for military-use during HA/DR 
operations and serve as a launching platform for responsible, effective 
transformation efforts. 
• CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS – will 
summarize the efforts of this research, solidify conclusions and make 


























II. HFN TECHNOLOGIES 
A. WHAT IS AN HFN 
With current technology, our society lives in a networked world where people can 
communicate digitally, using a wide variety of means that include telephones, email, 
instant messaging and video/web-hosted conferencing.  As technology advances and 
communication costs decline, the general public will continue to communicate, 
collaborate and cooperate even more.3  Machines have many ways to talk to one another.  
They enable people to make things happen more quickly, more effectively and across 
greater distances.  Machines can request services of one another or allow others to access 
their services and accomplish work remotely.  Furthermore, they share information and 
databases, which are often distributed among sub-databases and replicated to assure high 
availability in multiple locations.  Network protocols exist for allowing our machines to 
interact and operate wired or wireless.  In a matter of just a few years, there will be more 
devices communicating with one another than there are people on earth.4  Opportunities 
abound to use this advanced and cheaper technology for national and humanitarian 
interests. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) 
established the term hastily-formed network (HFN), which describes the combined 
actions of people in a network of multi-organizational groups, with no common authority, 
that collaborate to create coordinated action in crises.5  Such crisis can be a man-made 
disaster (9/11 attacks), a natural disaster (2005 Indonesia Tsunami and Hurricane 
Katrina) or an urgent operational/business necessity.  The following are characteristics of 
situations where an HFN may be necessary: 
• Genuine surprise: Advance planning, training or positioning of equipment 
has not been prepared for the unexpected event. 
• Chaos: People are frantic, panicked, overwhelmed and confused. 
                                                 
3 Dr. Rick Hayes-Roth, Hyper-Beings: How Intelligent Organizations Attain Supremacy through 
Information Superiority, 10-11, 2003.   
4 Ibid 
5 Clanon, Jeff . "SoL’s Hastily Formed Networks Project." Society for Organizational Learning. 
Society for Organizational Learning. 18 Sep 2006 <www.solonline.org>. 
8 
• Insufficient resources: Magnitude of the event overwhelms available 
resources. 
• Multi-agency response: Military, civilian government and/or private 
organizations are compelled collaborate, regardless of any lack of past 
teamwork experience.  
• Distributed response: The response is distributed over a geographical area 
into many local jurisdictions.  
• Lack of infrastructure: Infrastructures that provide communications, 
electricity and water will most likely not be operational.6   
For the purpose of cooperative collaboration, many view HFNs as a system that 
combines advanced networking technology and human organization issues.  Peter J. 
Denning argues that HFN’s are much more than a set of organizations using advanced 
networking technology.7  According to Denning, an HFN has five elements: (1) a 
network of people established rapidly (2) from different communities, (3) working 
together in a shared conversation space (4) in which they plan, commit to, and execute 
actions, to (5) fulfill a large, urgent mission.8  The broader concern is how to use these 
elements to respond to a crisis. 
B. HOW IS AN HFN USED 
After an unexpected disaster or event, one of the highest priorities of the first 
responders is to establish operative communications among involved agencies because it 
is a fundamental principle for successful planning and response to crisis situations.9  An 
effective communication system can provide the responders with critical information, 
which allows them to pool their knowledge and interpretations of the situation, 
understand what resources are available, assess options, plan responses, decide, commit, 
act and coordinate.  Without such a communication system, more than likely these 
actions may not happen and the responders may not function as effectively.10  An HFN  
                                                 
6 Chad Runge. "Disaster Relief Efforts & Information." Hastily Built Network to Deploy to Gulf 
Region . 09 SEP 2005. Naval Postgraduate School. 18 Sep 2006 
<http://www.nps.navy.mil/DisasterRelief/Katrina/news/20050909.htm>. 
7 Peter J. Denning, “The Profession of IT,” Communications of the ACM, Vol. 49, No. 4, April 2006.  
8 Ibid 
9 DHS Comprehensive Reviews Fact Sheet document, “Comprehensive Reviews Yield Effective 
Practices for Homeland Security,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 30 MAR 2006. 
10 Peter J. Denning, “The Profession of IT,” Communications of the ACM, Vol. 49, No. 4, April 2006. 
9 
used for HA/DR operations must (1) exist in an unclassified realm, (2) be operated by 
skilled and trained personnel and (3) have the appropriate components that satisfy the 
requirements. 
For the purposes of facilitating a collaborative environment between the military 
and NGOs, it is recommended for the HFN to be operated in an unclassified realm to 
support all users, deal with multiple connection types which include mesh enabled clients 
and support disadvantaged users to include sensors.  A HA/DR environment will most 
likely involve large number of personnel, from various organizations, attempting to sort 
out and manage the information flow.  Since the necessity for people to have network 
availability and share information is the root essence of an HFN, it is important that all 
applicable responders have access to the information.  Furthermore, if the commercial 
industry dominates the technological direction for HFNs, then the network will simply be 
unclassified by nature of the manufactured devices.11  Of course, there is the important 
concern of information assurance.  Although the general mission for HA/DR evolutions 
is to help people, security measures that support information assurance must still be 
practiced and enforced.  Unclassified information, that is both accessible to the right 
people and properly secured to protect validity, is essential for successful HA/DR 
operations.  
In addition to an unclassified realm, the responders to the crisis must also be 
trained to operate and understand the equipment of the HFN and comprehend the rules 
and protocols of dealing with HA/DR situations nationally and internationally.  To be 
effective in action, HFN participants must be skilled at:12 
• Setting up mobile communication and sensor systems. 
• Conducting interagency operations; also known as “civil-military 
boundary.”  
• Collaborating on action plans and coordinating their execution.  
• Leading a social network (where communication and decision-making are 
decentralized and there is no hierarchical chain of command). 
• Improvising. 
                                                 
11 David D. Lancaster, “Developing a Fly-away-kit to Support HFNs for HA/DR,” June 2005. 
12 Denning 
10 
Since most participants do not have a need for these skills in their individual 
organizations, there tends to be difficulty to accomplish these tasks when a crisis brings 
applicable organizations together.  When combined with the overwhelming nature of the 
urgent event, these inherent difficulties can lead to a breakdown in the communication 
system and the ways they interact within it.13  This is why organizations typically 
involved with HA/DR operations must properly train their response units to understand 
and operate HFN equipment.  After responders learn how to use HFNs, they must be able 
to trust and collaborate with other organizations involved with the operation.  Before 
dwelling into the trust and collaboration matter, participants must next ensure the HFN 
actually works. 
 
Figure 1.   HFN Components (From Lancaster) 
 
In order to properly function in action, an HFN must have the appropriate 
components that satisfy the requirements of operating in a HA/DR situation.  There are 
three main components that meet the requirements for an HFN:14 
1) Back-haul connection is the main connection that links a remote site to the 
rest of the world. The remote terminating end of the back-haul is normally 
referred to as a point of presence.  An example of a back-haul connection 
is a commercial satellite connected to the internet or possibly a 
                                                 
13 Peter J. Denning, “The Profession of IT,” Communications of the ACM, Vol. 49, No. 4, April 2006. 
14 David D. Lancaster, “Developing a Fly-away-kit to Support HFNs for HA/DR,” June 2005. 
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headquarters facility.  Commercial satellites meet the mobility and 
availability requirements of a HA/DR HFN.  Other solutions include 
terrestrial fiber, serial or DSL connections.  
2) Last mile connections are links from the point of presence to displaced 
units throughout the area of operations.  The purpose of these connections 
is to maximize use of the broadband connection to the point of presence 
device, particularly because of limitations of the displaced units.  Due to 
the flexible and transportable requirements of an HFN, most solutions for 
last mile connectivity are wireless.  Example solutions include free-space 
optics, IEEE 802.11 WiFi and IEEE 802.16 WiMAX. 
3) Connecting network devices support the flexible connections between the 
back-haul solution and the last-mile solution.  This collection of 
equipment acts as the point of presence node.  The purpose of these 
devices is to ensure the HFN is mobile and capable of supporting multiple 
connections and applications.  Ethernet is the recommended 
interconnectivity with other devices.  An example solution is a Fly-away-
kit (FLAK).  A FLAK should be self contained, rugged, transportable and 
contain everything essential to supporting operations at an alternate site.  
The success of an effective HFN is based on how well networking technologies, 
sensor systems, autonomous coordination, human communication, improvisation, 
organizational theory and trust is incorporated in the communication system.15 
C. INTRODUCTION OF HFN EQUIPMENT USED 
For 2006, COASTS intended to provide a robust IEEE 802.11 wireless mesh 
network to enable seamless network connectivity for sensor, UAV and mobile client 
operations throughout the AOR. 
1. 802.11 
The IEEE 802.11 equipment chosen for COASTS 2006 are the Mesh Dynamics 
multiradio back-haul access points.  The reason for selecting Mesh Dynamics is the 
advertised improved bandwidth over single-radio implementations of mesh networks, 
their ability to withstand and perform in austere environmental conditions, and their form 
factor.  According to Mesh Dynamics a single-radio unit uses the same radio to both send 
and receive which cannot be accomplished simultaneously.  The access points (nodes) 
listen then retransmit.  Also, all nodes operate on the same channel which, depending on 
the topology, causes a 50% bandwidth loss for each hop. 
                                                 
15 Chad Runge. "Disaster Relief Efforts & Information." Hastily Built Network to Deploy to Gulf 
Region . 09 SEP 2005. Naval Postgraduate School. 18 Sep 2006 
<http://www.nps.navy.mil/DisasterRelief/Katrina/news/20050909.htm>. 
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Two mesh architectures are shown in Figure 2 below.  Most mesh products are a 
variant of the approach shown on the left.  One radio services clients (pink) while the 
other radio (blue) forms a single radio ad hoc back-haul mesh.  The radios operate in non 
interfering bands:  2.4 GHz (pink) for service and 5.8 GHz (blue) for the back-haul.  Note 
that the wireless back-haul is still a single radio - only one radio (blue) is part of the back-
haul.  Packets share bandwidth at each hop along the path with other interfering mesh 
back-hauls - all operating on the same channel - because it is a single radio wireless back-
haul. 
 
Figure 2.   MeshDynamics multi-radio back-haul Simultaneous Send and Receive (From: 
F. Acosta) 
 
MeshDynamics Mesh Products have two back-haul radios (for uplink/downlink) 
and a third 2.4GHz service radio.  The back-haul up link and down link “talk” on 
different channels. Bandwidth degradation effects endemic to single radio back-hauls are 
eliminated - each radio link operates independently and simultaneous send/receives are 
now possible.  The separate uplink and downlink emulates wired switch stacks.  This 
architecture supports scalable networks.  Minimal performance degradation is 
experienced, even over several WAP segments.   
In the unlicensed space, interference from other radios is a fact of life.  Reduced 
performance by operating on a “polluted” channel is especially significant in dense metro 
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areas.  In 1-radio back-hauls all radios share the same channel.  Interference on that 
channel affects the entire network.  In contrast, a 2-radio back-haul is more agile: the 
back-haul radios can switch to other channels to mitigate local interference sources. 
The MeshDynamics Modular Mesh framework is purpose built to ensure 
interoperability between members of the product family.  Modules form a network even 
if back-haul operate in different frequency bands. 
 
Figure 3.   Modular Mesh Interoperable Network (From: F. Acosta) 
 
As an example (See Figure 3), the two mobile nodes above communicate with 
each other, though they are operating on different back-haul bands.  The “service” radio 
of node 4455 is acting as the parent downlink for node 4325.  Also edge nodes 4220 
connects with relay node 4350 through the service radio.  
Since 2.4GHz has more range than 5.8GHz radios, a 2.4GHz back-haul is 
preferable in low client density situations (such as rural areas) or at edges of the network 
where the interference is low.  Interference increases with increasing client densities (as 
in urban areas).  The 2.4GHz edge node (4220) does not become obsolete: it may be field 
upgraded to a 3-Radio 5.8GHz back-haul + AP (4350).  The 4350 unit may be field  
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upgraded to a 4-radio module if additional downlinks (4452) or an additional AP (4458) 
is needed.  Other mesh products have not been designed with this level of flexibility in 
mind.16 
Due to the stated strengths of the Modular Mesh system, it was selected for 
implementation by the COASTS 2006 project.  As such, and to maintain interoperability 
within the mesh, a MD mobile access point was selected as the 802.11 Wireless Access 
Point (WAP) payload for the VTOL UAV surrogate. 
The Mesh Dynamics access points are highly configurable allowing varying radio 
powers, operating frequencies, in the IEEE 802.11 a/b/g standards, and software 
configurations to suit specific applications.  COASTS 2006 will employ the device 






Four slot mini-PCI motherboard with two 400mW Ubiquity SuperRange 5, 
IEEE 802.11a, 5.8GHz back-haul radios, one 400mW Ubiquity SuperRange 




Four slot mini-PCI motherboard with two 400mW Ubiquity SuperRange 2, 
IEEE 802.11b/g, 2.4GHz back-haul/service radios, one 64mW 2.4GHz 
scanning radio with mobility software features 
Table 1.   Mesh Dynamics Access Point Configurations, COASTS 2006 
 
The IEEE 802.11 equipment will be employed in the following areas: 
i. Seamless network connectivity across the Mae Ngat Dam consisting of 
four ground based nodes and three balloon nodes laid out in an arc 
stretching approximately 1.2 miles.  See Figures 4 and 5 below. 
ii. Aboard UAV platforms enabling video and flight control and aloft in 
balloons to further extend the range of the network in terms of client and 
back-haul connections.  
                                                 
16 Francis Acosta. " Why Meshdynamics Structured MeshTM is Different." Mesh Dynamics. Mesh 
Dynamics. 18 Sep 2006 <http://www.meshdynamics.com/WhyStructuredMesh.html>. 
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Figure 4.   COASTS 2006 802.11 Network Topology 
Mae Ngat Dam, Chiang Mai, Thailand (From COASTS 2006 CONOPS) 
 
 
Figure 5.   Side View of COASTS 2006 802.11 Topology (From COASTS 2006 
CONOPS) 
 
Several different node configurations (defined here as all equipment needed to 
establish connectivity) will be used to form the 802.11 seamless structured mesh network 
across the Mae Ngat Dam.  These are defined by location below (see Figure 4 and 5 for 
detailed location). 
• Configuration one: TOC Node (referred to as the ‘root’ node) (see Table 
2) 
• Configuration two: Lists one set which is used on Nodes 2 and 3 (total of 
2 sets, one set at each node) (see Table 3) 
• Configuration three: Node 4 (see Table 4) 
• Configuration four: Lists one set which is used on Balloon Nodes 1, 2, and 
3 (total of 3 sets to cover these three nodes) (see Table 5) 
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Table 2.   Configuration One 
 
 




Table 4.   Configuration Three 
 





The IEEE 802.16 equipment chosen for COASTS 2006 is the Redline 
Communication  AN-50e high speed wireless Ethernet bridge configured either for point-
to-point (PTP) operation or for point-to-multipoint (PMP) operation.  These devices will 
allow for both back-haul and access functions.  The dominant reason for using Redline 
Communications is their proven performance during COASTS 2005 exercises.  The 
Redline Ethernet bridges are highly configurable allowing varying radio powers, 
operating frequencies, in the IEEE 802.16e standards, and software configurations to suit 
specific applications.  
 




There is a variety of UAV equipment being operates as part of the COASTS 2006 
field experimentation process.  The first is the RotoMotion Vertical Take-Off and 
Landing (VTOL) UAV.  This unit has an electric engine and a payload of up to 18 lbs.  
This UAV is capable of fully autonomous flight with a safety operator to perform takeoff 
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and landing and to engage and disengage the autonomous flight control system (AFCS).  




Figure 7.   RotoMotion VTOL UAV (From COASTS 2006 CONOPS) 
 
Next is the CyberDefense CYBERBUG.  This parasail design has an electric 
engine and a payload of up to 2.5 lbs.  This UAV is also capable of fully autonomous 
flight with a range of 14 miles using GPS.  The CYBERBUG was equipped with a 
day/night camera capable of broadcasting live video from a distance of up to three miles. 
 
Figure 8.   CyberDefense CYBERBUG (From COASTS 2006 CONOPS) 
 
Finally, is a COTS RC helicopter.  This unit was chosen as a less expensive 
option to extend the wireless network as an airborne relay.  It has an electric engine and a 
payload of up to seven lbs.  This UAV is currently airline transportable as a carryon item.  
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The range is limited to line of sight, usually less than one third of a mile.  The helicopter 
was also used to gather live video data using a small wireless camera. 
 
Figure 9.   COTS RC Electric Helicopter (From COASTS 2006 CONOPS) 
 
4. Balloons 
The COASTS project uses a balloon payload for two reasons.  First, it can extend 
the mesh network and create a greater coverage area by carrying wireless access points.  
Second, it can carry a camera with full pan-tilt-zoom capability onboard which increases 
the field of view, allowing personnel to visually track any incident that may occur.  
Positioning the camera on the balloon provides a higher position which in turn provides a 
greater area of coverage for visual target acquisition 
Three Blimp Works 3M Balloons provided an aerial platform for the network. 
Each balloon can carry a payload of 28 lbs.  
 
Figure 10.   Blimp Works Balloon (From COASTS 2006 CONOPS) 
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5. Remote Client 
The final piece in testing the mesh network is having an individual client 
associate with the mesh.  This enables connectivity from the network center through the 
mesh and ultimately terminating with the client.  The hardware configurations used were: 
• Dell D510 Laptop 
• Proxim Orinoco Gold b/g Wireless Card 
• 3dBi Rubber Bullet Multi-polar antenna 
 




























III. DATA COLLECTION 
A. FIELD EXPERIMENTS 
1. COASTS’ Point Sur Testing 
The purpose of the Point Sur Testing was to evaluate all functional aspects of the 
COASTS networking project in an operational (field) environment.  It was essential to 
deploy and integrate the equipment out of the laboratory environment to ensure that it 
would be robust enough for the overseas portion of the program, specifically the Thailand 
Field Experiment.  Because there were DoD budget shortfalls early in the new fiscal year, 
only a few components of each part of the greater network were available for testing.17 
a. Components 
The components used for the Point Sur field experiment were addressed in 
Chapter 2, part C.  The exception is that there were no UAV’s used during this field 
experiment as Point Sur does not have any unrestricted airspace as required by the 
Federal Aviation Authority for all UAV operations. 
b. Capabilities 
The demonstrated capabilities of the Point Sur field experiment are 
organized into two categories.  First, to provide mission-critical communications and 
second, ensure that the components used are available commercially, off the shelf 
(COTS).  For this field experiment COASTS was able to use the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s NEMESIS mobile command center (converted recreational vehicle) and back-
haul satellite link to the World Wide Web from the 802.11 structured mesh network.  In 
essence a small version of the final proposed network for the Thailand Field Experiment 
was successfully created in a remote operating area. 
c. Coverage 
The coverage area for the Point Sur field experiment for the 802.11 
network was an area roughly three square miles.  The area of coverage was centered on 
and around the U.S. Navy SOSUS station located at Point Sur, California. 
                                                 
17 COASTS Point Sur Field Experiment After Action Report, December 2005. 
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Figure 12.   Pt. Sur Operation Area (From COASTS 2005 Pt Sur CONOPS) 
 
d. Cost 
The costs for the Thailand field experiment need to be broken into many 
different subcategories.  They are listed below in Figure 8.  There were no additional 
transportation or lodging costs incurred with this particular field experiment. 
 
Equipment Cost 
802.11 Wireless Access Points $8,000  
802.11 Antennas / Wireless Access Cards $2,000  
Balloons / Winches / Helium $4,000  
Power (Batteries / Generators) $1,000 
NEMESIS Operating Costs $1,000 
3 Contractors $17,000 
2 Faculty Members $10,000 
Total $43,000  
Table 6.   Cost for Point Sur Experiment 
 
2. COASTS’ Thailand Testing 
The underlying scenario used for the COASTS 2006 field experiment was 
conceived to test the implementation of commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment and 








trafficking across the Thai-Burma border, (2) provide actionable information (real-time) 
to local, regional, and strategic level decision-makers, and (3) shorten the sensor-to-
shooter cycle.18 
a. Components 
The components used for the Thailand field experiment were addressed in 
Chapter 2, part C.  Additional components were provided by the Thailand military and 
government.  An AU-23 Peacemaker aircraft was used as an airborne video collection 
platform.  Data was sent, via the WiMax back-haul, to the Inter-agency Intelligence and 
Fusion Center (IIFC), in Northern Thailand.  This data center acted as a Command and 
Control (C2) Center for this experiment, but could easily be replaced by any facility 
needing data from a HA/DR site such a hospital or refugee camp. 
b. Capabilities 
The demonstrated capabilities of the Thailand field experiment are 
organized into numerous categories.  First, to provide mission-critical communications.  
Second, ensure that the components used are available commercially, off the shelf 
(COTS).  Third, demonstrate the ability for inter-operability between foreign military 
partners.  Fourth, demonstrate the ability to operate and test in a multitude of adverse 
weather and terrain conditions.  Finally, demonstrate the ability to address and overcome 
connectivity issues (bandwidth and technological limitations) with foreign C2 assets. 
c. Coverage 
The coverage area for the Thailand field experiment for the 802.11 
network was an area roughly twelve kilometers square.  The area of coverage arced 
around the Mae Ngat Dam, in Chiang Mai, Thailand.  
                                                 
18 COASTS Thailand Field Experiment After Action Report, July 2006. 
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Figure 13.   802.11 Network Nodes at Mae Ngat Dam (From COASTS 2006 CONOPS) 
 
d. Cost 
The costs for the Thailand field experiment need to be broken into many 
different subcategories.  They are listed below in Figure 13.  In addition to the costs in 
Figure 13, there was an additional cost of $74,000 for transportation and lodging for NPS 
students that was incurred during the Thailand field experiment. 
 
Equipment Cost 
802.11 Wireless Access Points $40,000  
802.11 Antennas / Wireless Access Cards $10,000  
Tactical Operations Center $35,000  
Balloons / Winches / Helium $20,000  
Power (Batteries / Generators) $6,000  
UAV's $80,000  
3 Contractors $33,000 
2 Faculty Members $10,000 
Total $234,000  
Table 7.    Cost for Thailand Field Experiment 
 
3. PacketHop’s C2 Solution for GGSN (Comparable Application) 
In order to add variety of field testing external of COASTS projects, additional 
data was collected from a homeland security field experiment simulating a terrorist attack 
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at the Golden Gate Bridge.  Under the leadership of the California Governor’s Office of 
Emergency Services (CGOES), the exercise was driven by the Golden Gate Safety 
Network (GGSN), a San Francisco-based coalition made up of federal, state and local 
public agencies.   
a. Background 
After 9/11, GGSN was in need of a multi-agency, interoperable 
communications system for the following requirements: 19 
• Fire, police and emergency medical personnel from Marin County and San 
Francisco could use interoperable broadband communications to resolve 
prospective terrorist threats on the Golden Gate Bridge. 
• Search and rescue workers could share wireless video and images of lost 
teens while searching isolated areas of San Francisco’s National Golden 
Gate Recreational Parks. 
• The Incident Commander could effectively coordinate first responders on 
land, sea and air (after a 7.5 magnitude earthquake at Fisherman’s Wharf) 
and do it during the critical period when the pre-existing communication 
infrastructure is temporarily or permanently unavailable. 
To acquire such a system, GGSN requested for an IT solution from 
PacketHop, a Silicon Valley-based company.  They were impressed with PacketHop’s 
mobile mesh networking software that provides and wanted the advantages of having a 
survivable, interoperable broadband data communications system that could be setup 
anywhere, anytime and with any device.20   
b. Field Experiment 
GGSN formally collaborated with PacketHop to develop a commercially 
viable and cost-effective solution for enabling multimedia situational awareness and C2 
communications.  In February 2004, more than a year later, GGSN conducted a long-
awaited homeland security field experiment to test the ability of multiple agencies to 
communicate, coordinate and respond using PacketHop's technology for the purpose of 
protecting the Bay Area and Golden Gate Bridge against threats. 
                                                 
19 David Thompson, “Mobile Mesh Networking: Bridge to the Future of Broadband Wireless,” 
Private Wireless, Vol. 12, June/July 2004.  




Figure 14.   GGSN Area of Operations for February 2004 Experiment (From: Packethop) 
 
The highlight of the three-hour exercise was the demonstration of the 
broadband mesh connectivity enabling multi-jurisdictional first responders to share and 
view broadband data applications, such as resource tracking on base maps, multicast 
video, secure multimedia messaging and white boarding, among others.21  The first 
responders ranged from federal, military, police, firefighting and other agencies.  
PacketHop’s Vice-President, David Thompson, claimed this was the first time all of these 
agencies were able to share mission-critical information on a real-time basis.22   
c. Components 
The complete PacketHop network system, as used during the field 
experiment, consisted of the following components: 
• Network controller- a secure high-performance appliance that 
interconnects multiple mesh networks. 
• Network management system- real-time control for both distributed and 
centralized operations.   
• Network client software- installed on each wireless device. 
• Modular applications- tuned for mobile mesh. 
                                                 
21 “Urban Meshed Warrior,” Daily Wireless, 25 FEB 2004, 
www.dailywireless.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2130&src=rss10 
22 David Thompson, “Mobile Mesh Networking: Bridge to the Future of Broadband Wireless,” 
Private Wireless, Vol. 12, June/July 2004. 
29 
• Situational awareness applications- PacketHop developed these set of 
applications, specifically for GGSN and homeland security, to bolster C2 
functionality and operate in a peer-to-peer, server-less environment over 
any IP network and any IP device. 
According to Terry Krout, Marin County Sheriff for OES, “The situational 
awareness applications enable everyone – whether at command center or a cop rolling on 
to the scene – to see the incident real-time, and then, best evaluate and leverage assets in 
the field.”23  This was how the first responders were able to view and share broadband 
data applications, such as resource tracking on base maps, multicast video, secure 
multimedia messaging and white boarding.   
A total of 35 nodes, including a mobile van, marine units and fixed sites, 
were connected across diverse devices, difficult terrain and disjointed networks.  
Additionally, CGOES commanded the operation remotely by connecting a virtual private 
network (VPN) to the system.  Every node was equipped with GPS capabilities for the 
purpose of transferring positional data.  Furthermore, the network system was used to 
transfer video, including multiple camera angles of the same scene viewed by different 
nodes.  Since PacketHop's technology does not require a central server, responders 
communicated via a peer-to-peer messaging system. 
As a commercially viable solution, the PacketHop software can be easily 
loaded onto virtually any standard IP radio (802.11) equipped device, such as laptops, 
tablets and PDAs.  Response agencies were outfitted with these ruggedized COTS 
devices.  Two dozen Windows-based laptops, tablets and PDAs were supplied by 
partners 3eTI, Itronix, Intermec, Panasonic, Proxim, Symbol, TDS and Xybernaut.24 
d. Capabilities 
The demonstrated capabilities of the showcased solution are organized 
into three categories:25 
                                                 
23 David Thompson, “Mobile Mesh Networking: Bridge to the Future of Broadband Wireless,” 
Private Wireless, Vol. 12, June/July 2004. 
24 "Urban Meshed Warrior." Dailywireless.org. 25 FEB 2004. Dailywireless.org. 18 Sep 2006 
<http://www.dailywireless.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2130&src=rss10>. 
25 Michele Spring, Thornton, Laurie. "PacketHop Deploys First Multi-Agency, Mission-Critical, 
Mobile Broadband Communications Network For Homeland Security." Mayfield Fund - PacketHop. 25 
FEB 2004. Mayfield Fund. 18 Sep 2006 <http://www.mayfield.com/newsarticles/packethop022504.htm>.  
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1. Survivable, mission-critical communications 
• Instant provisioning of survivable network  
• No dependence on fixed infrastructure   
• Network extension to uncovered areas 
• Data delivery and security assurance on any IP network 
2. Real-time, interoperable broadband communications 
• Roaming and mobility across all networks (fixed or infrastructure-less) 
• Seamless integration with all networks (fixed-to-mobile or mobile-to-
mobile) 
• Mobile broadband in the field with real-time, secure situational awareness  
3. Cost-effective, commercially viable solution  
• Compatible with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment 
• Operates with existing devices (laptops, tablets, PDAs) 
• Uses standards-based solutions for software and hardware 
• Leverages Wi-Fi/802.11 and multi-mode broadband radios 
 
Figure 15.   Screen Capture showing Packet Hop Technologies (From: Packethop) 
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Basically, PacketHop transformed every device involved with the exercise 
into a proactive router that tracked other devices in the dynamic and ever-changing 
wireless mesh.  As a result, every field device was more than capable of communicating 
with each other, along with any traditional fixed IP infrastructure (802.11 access points) 
that may have been available.  The significance of this was that a mobile, high-secure, 
interoperable and survivable broadband communication system was formed 
instantaneously.  In addition, data transmissions were optimized because each device 
made efficient use of all the network resources available to it.26 
The PacketHop software authenticates all the users, allowing them to use 
instant messaging and video conferencing.  It also displays the location of the responders 
if they are GPS equipped.  As required by the HA/DR operations, users are added to or 
removed from the network on the fly.  The one capability the PacketHop solution did not 
support for the field exercise was voice.27  Again, the experiment was performed in 2004 




Figure 16.   Coverage Area for the GGSN 2004 Field Experiment (From: Packethop) 
                                                 
26 David Thompson, “Mobile Mesh Networking: Bridge to the Future of Broadband Wireless,” 
Private Wireless, Vol. 12, June/July 2004. 
27 Andrew Kantor, “In the communication age, connection is everything,” USA Today, 08 DEC 2005. 
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With communication vehicles and devices (high-gain antennas) in place, 
PacketHop’s network system spanned approximately 150 miles over land and sea; 
extending from the Presidio north to Marin County and including nodes on Coast Guard 
and San Francisco Police Department ships in the bay.28  During the field exercise, the 
system connected first responders that were positioned around the Golden Gate National 
Recreational Area to a local incident command center and the CGOES operations center 
in Sacramento.29 
f. Cost 
Mesh networking in various applications is becoming a low-cost 
alternative for municipalities.  Cities and towns should evaluate mesh 
technologies to enhance data communications and improve public safety 
interoperability. Behind such deployments are productivity gains, ease of 
deployment, and the ability to deliver first responder interoperability at a 
fraction of the cost of a land mobile radio system. 
- Jeff Vining, vice president of Gartner Research, in a Gartner market 
research report titled “Mesh Networking Improves First Responder's 
Efficiency.”30 
 
A detailed cost breakdown of PacketHop’s solution, as used during the 
2004 field experiment, was not disclosed by the company or GGSN.  For marketing and 
commercial-modification purposes, the company is not advertising the cost of the 
solution.  Just recently in August 2006, PacketHop introduced the new software as the 
“Communication System for Public Safety” and advertised that it delivers instant, mobile 
broadband communications for law enforcement agencies and mobile workgroups in the 
enterprise.  The following product specifications and requirements are taken directly from 
the company’s official website: 
 
                                                 
28 Griffith, Eric. "Meshing with Homeland." Wi-Fi Planet. 26 FEB 2004. Wi-Fi Planet. 18 Sep 2006 
<http://www.wi-fiplanet.com/news/article.php/3318551>. 
29 "Urban Meshed Warrior." Dailywireless.org. 25 FEB 2004. Dailywireless.org. 18 Sep 2006 
<http://www.dailywireless.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2130&src=rss10>. 
30 "Archived news extracts about GPS and Wireless Technologies 2005." GPS-practice-and-fun. 11 
JUL 2005. GPS/Wireless. 18 Sep 2006 <http://www.gps-practice-and-fun.com/archived-gps-wireless-
news-2005.html>. 
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(1) Product Specification.   
Network: 
• Support for standard IEEE 802.11a/b/g WiFi and 4.9 GHz spectrum  
• Multicast - send data such as video or Instant Message to multiple people 
simultaneously  
• Multihopping: Passes data through computers to reach other users in the 
mesh, even if they are out of range of the originating computer. No 
practical limit on the number of hops - latency will increase with multiple 
hops but can be decreased with increased CPU  
• Optimized for transmission over faster WiFi and 4.9 GHz local 
connections as well as slower cellular or satellite back-haul networks. 
Adapts to network and network conditions  
• Optimize between multicast and unicast to conserve bandwidth  
• Security  
• WPA2 security with AES encryption at the wireless layer  
• SSL VPN with AES encryption provides secure tunneling on top 
of the wireless layer  
• Performance Criteria  
• Range: up to 1 km line of sight in the 4.9 GHz band  
• Throughput: Traffic shaping optimizes throughput for high and 
low bandwidth network connections  
 
Applications: 
• Video  
• View up to 4 video streams over high bandwidth networks  
• View 1 video stream over cellular networks  
• Video streams only sent on viewer request to maximize bandwidth. 
Otherwise, video thumbnails are sent  
• Mapping  
• Integrate with any standard maps  
• Use maps with or without GPS for location tracking  
• White boarding  
• White board on video screens, maps or blank screens  
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• Instant Messaging (IM)  
• Insert standard public safety shortcuts  
• Message one or multiple people  
• Configure groups on-the-fly or preset groups  
• Send files such as pictures or reports  
 
Systems Management Console: 
• Web-based administration  
• Acts as a VPN gateway and router and provides communication between 
multiple submeshes  
• Provides provisioning of client devices  
• Supports up to 500 users simultaneously 
 
(2) System Requirements 
Client System Requirements: 
• Windows XP Service Pack 2  
• Windows XP Tablet PC Edition 2005  
• Microsoft .NET Framework Version 1.1  
• Processor: 1 GHz Pentium 4 or Pentium M or later with 512 K L2 cache  
• RAM: 256 MB minimum; 512 MB recommended  
• Hard Drive: 20 GB, minim 1 GB free  
• PacketHop specified network interface card (NIC)  
• B PacketHop recommended antenna and cables  
 
Server System Requirements: 
• The Systems Management Console (SMC) is delivered from PacketHop 






• Video cameras  
• GPS receivers 31 
Cost for the software might be the biggest concern for most public safety 
agencies, at least for those without any Homeland Security funding.  PacketHop will 
charge a fee based on the number of users with annual maintenance support contracts.  
Company representatives would not definitively state the price, but estimated it at around 
$2,000 per end-user device, while the management console with Gateway software will 
cost around $25,000.32 
“It might be more than some laptops,” says David Thompson, PacketHop's 
vice president of marketing, “but this is a brand new, breakthrough technology.”  
Thompson compared it to the price of installing a permanent infrastructure for mesh 
networking, citing a frequently-used number in some circles of $160,000 per square mile 
to install permanent mesh equipment.  He further states that even a permanent mesh 
infrastructure will still have holes and may not be capable of penetrating through 
buildings; as Thompson implied PacketHop’s network is capable of doing, assuming it 
has enough nodes.  PacketHop is aware of the $10.9B allocated by the federal 
government for helping first responders improve equipment. This is the target audience 
that the company is relying on for profitable returns.33 
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IV. FINANCIAL OPPORTUNITIES 
A. MARKET COMPARABLE APPROACH 
1. Overview 
The DoD is adopting commercial business practices in an effort to make better 
business decisions, increase operational efficiencies and improve cost control.  The 
Market Comparable Approach is a means of “determining a value indication of a 
business, business ownership interest, security or intangible asset by using one or more 
methods that compare the subject to similar businesses, business ownership interests, 
securities or intangible assets that have been sold.”34  In simpler terms, this methodology 
looks at what the market would pay for the asset.  Other activities may refer to this 
practice as the Guideline Method because it directs appraisers to use a similar public 
company as a guideline for valuing a private company.35  One of the focuses of this 
research was identifying public companies that utilize mobile network communications 
for operations in rural environments and using these businesses as a guideline for valuing 
the DoD services in HA/DR situations.   
The Market Comparable Approach is a seasoned business practice in the real 
estate profession but it is a new practice in the DoD.  In determining market value, the 
real estate appraiser seeks data on sales of comparable properties while the business 
appraiser seeks data on transactions of comparable businesses.  By investing in 
commercial HFN technology, the DoD is taking the perspective of the business appraiser.  
The market for businesses has a tendency to change more rapidly than the market for real 
estate due to tangible and intangible assets.  These assets each have their own price 
instability and risks of ownership.  A general rule in determining the guideline company 
selection is that analysts should keep in mind the underlying investment risk and 
expected rate of return characteristics of the public company in comparison to the subject 
company/organization (DoD activity in this case).36  
                                                 
34 International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms, June 2001. 
35 Neal Fisher, “Valuation: Theory vs Practice.” Miller, Cooper & Co., LTD. 23 MAY 2006 
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36 Shannon P. Pratt, Robert F. Reilly and Robert P. Schweichs, “Valuing a Business”, 4th Edition, 
McGraw-Hill Publishing, 2000, pp 45-47, 232. 
38 
Typically, it is difficult to find a set of good guideline companies to match the 
uniqueness of the DoD mission-critical requirements (i.e.- support readiness and war-
fighting/MOOTW capabilities) and funding processes (appropriations, reimbursables and 
revolving funds).  DoD business practices are also constrained by government regulations 
and military specifications.  For the most part, the DoD is effective in achieving its 
missions, but it lacks the efficiency needed for competitive business.  Adopting private-
sector methodology, such as the Market Comparable Approach, can help improve the 
efficiency of DoD’s business practices.  In the commercial market, businesses are 
governed by the laws of supply and demand and management is focused on revenue 
generated profitability, return on investments (ROI) and cost control.37  The DoD is a 
non-profit organization, but it is still concerned in making smart decisions regarding ROI 
and cost controls.  Comparing military network capabilities for crisis control with 
emergency response services of private enterprises can help improve cost controls 
through comparison of estimates versus actual costs and extract substantial ROI in the 
long term by examining the variables that significantly affect the benefit over cost ratio. 
2. Guideline (Market Comparable) Business Selections 
The use of comparable publicly held corporations as a guide to valuation, 
as a practical matter, may be the most important and appropriate technique 
for valuing a privately held operating business.  Obviously finding a 
business exactly the same as the enterprise to be valued is an 
impossibility.  The standard sought is usually one of reasonable and 
justifiable similarity.  This degree of likeness is attainable in most cases.38 
Determining a market comparable for this research required the narrowing down of 
several organizations and businesses that have the need to establish C2 capabilities in 
isolated or undeveloped areas.  The following businesses that were first eliminated from 
our research selection were actually descent market comparables, considering they all 
expected to operate in rural environments: 
• Non-hazardous field research 
• Mobile educational/training institutes 
• New development or construction companies 
                                                 
37 "The Free Market Approach." OSD Comptroller iCenter. DoD Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
18 Sep 2006 <http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/icenter/dwcf/freemarket.htm>. 
38 Frank M. Burke, Jr., Valuation and Valuation Planning for Closely Held Business, 1981, pg 49. 
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• Outdoor concert event or fairground coordinators  
• Traveling circuses or carnivals 
• Farm, winery or plantation businesses  
These possible market comparables were missing the key element of urgency.  This 
urgency is driven by the state of emergency caused by natural or man-made disasters, 
requiring the organization to respond and possibly enter “harm’s way.”  Experts of the 
market comparable approach would still recommend to use this group of businesses to 
shed some light on market value concerns, but focus on one or two directly comparable to 
the DoD than the rest.  Data can be tabulated for the whole group but value more weight 
on the data collected from the guideline businesses considered most comparable.39  
Fortunately for this research, the industry for emergency network capabilities for crisis 
situations has recently grown due to the obvious need from recent natural disasters.  The 
following professional businesses are market comparables that better match the 
requirements of our study: 
• News reporting teams or field journalists  
• Hazardous field research (i.e.- Tornado “Chasers”) 
• Surveillance teams 
• Ambulance service providers  
• Firefighter/Police/Emergency response teams 
These are ideal organizations that would benefit from mobile network communication 
systems.  From this category, the search for a guideline business selection began. 
3. First Selection 
There are several types of ambulance service providers, such as volunteer, 
municipal, municipal third, combined and hospital-based services.  In the U.S., 
ambulance services may be provided by a private company that may either be a non-
profit charity or profit-driven business.40  Private ambulance providers serve as a 
community's safety net for those regularly occurring 9-1-1 system calls for first response, 
patient care and transport.  There are numerous commercial ambulance service providers 
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advertised on the world-wide web, so to narrow the selection process, only well-
established and locally stationed companies were considered for this market comparable 
study.   
Approximately 90% of the emergency medical services response and patient 
transport in California communities falls to private ambulance operations during a natural 
disaster, act of terrorism or other large scale incident.41 This commercial industry 
routinely sends ambulance resources to support local public safety agencies, which 
include fire departments and law enforcement agencies, at mass casualty incidents such 
as recent wildfires, train derailments and floods.   
The nation’s leading provider of medical transportation is American Medical 
Response Inc. (AMR), a subsidiary of Emergency Medical Services Corp.42  This well-
established private company has more than 18,000 paramedics, emergency medical 
technicians (EMTs), nurses, doctors and other professional support staff that annually 
transport nearly 4 million patients nationwide in non-emergency, emergency and critical 
situations.  AMR is headquartered in Greenwood Village, Colorado and locally operated 
in 36 states and the District of Columbia.  Operating a fleet of approximately 4,400 
vehicles, they serve more than 250 communities in both western and eastern regions.43 
 
Figure 17.   American Medical Response Emergency Response Team (From: AMR.net) 
                                                 
41 "California's Emergency Medical Response Systems in Crisis." Medical News Today. 27 FEB 2005. 
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42 Moore, Douglas. "AMR is Awarded FEMA Contract for Disaster Response in New Orleans and 





Furthermore, AMR is consistently involved in HA/DR operations.  During 
Hurricane Katrina, AMR provided the following services44: 
• 9-1-1 EMS services in Gulfport, Mississippi and provided ambulance 
service in several other communities within the state. 
• Mobilizing resources and making preparations for hurricane victims prior 
to the storm actually hitting the coast. 
• Provided an additional 100 plus ambulances and nearly 300 paramedics, 
EMTs and other professionals to aid with the rescue, transportation and 
medical care to hurricane victims. 
• Coordinating with federal, state and local officials in deploying additional 
unit and crews where they are most needed. 
• Continuing to aid in rescue operations and provide medical care and 
transport to hurricane victims in the coastal areas of Mississippi, Louisiana 
and Alabama. 
• Providing additional resources in Texas to aid in the transport of evacuees 
to medical facilities in Houston, San Antonio and Arlington.  AMR 
anticipated the situation would escalate as additional evacuees arrive and 
patients were transported from existing disaster centers.  
In a market comparable study, it makes sense to be interested in comparing the 
value of having commercial ambulance services that provide medical transport and care 
in the operational field against the value of multiple agencies utilizing an available 
network system as an effective means of C2 capabilities during a crisis response.  In 
addition, researching the profits that AMR achieved from the Hurricane Katrina situation 
could be helpful in determining the financial value of HFNs in a business perspective.  
For these reasons, AMR was chosen as the first guideline business selection for the 
financial analysis.     
4. Second Selection 
The next business selection is focused on firefighters, the first responders who 
work closely with other emergency response agencies, particularly local and state police 
departments.  U.S. firefighters work under the auspices of fire departments that are 
generally organized as local or county government subsidiaries, special-purpose district 
entities or not-for-profit corporations.  The federal government, as well as some state 
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governments, operates fire departments to protect their wild lands.45  Nationwide, only a 
small number of U.S. fire departments are privatized.  But in recent years, the number of 
private firefighters in the western region has grown significantly.46   
Private firefighters have been helping out with wildfires throughout the west; 
almost 2,000 from Oregon alone.  An astounding 98 out of 121 Oregon-based crews, 
dispatched to fires in Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah and Nevada, were 
contracted from private companies.47  During busy wildfire years, the Forest Service 
generally turns to contract crews when a number of large fires are burning and the 
availability of fire crews is scarce.  In such instances, the private crews are often assigned 
to the larger fires while the federal crews handle the initial attack of new fire outbreaks.48 
Beginning in the 1990’s, the federal government started outsourcing private crews 
on a larger scale in Oregon and Washington.  By the turn of the century, the number of 
private firefighters dispatched from the Northwest surpassed government crews.49  
Grayback Forestry (GF), one of the Oregon-based private companies, provides multiple 
contract services which include firefighting crews, portable showers, fire engines and 
helicopters that assist the U.S. Forest Service and other firefighting government agencies.  
During summer months, they provide wildfire suppression and emergency services, 
providing Type 2 and Type 2 IA crews, Type 6 engines, Type 4 engines and tactical 
tenders.  In 2003, GF provided 15 crews of 20 responders to help battle the western 
wildfires.50  
For this study, GF was chosen as the second guideline business selection because 
of their role as first responders to wildfires and their status of being a privatized, profit-
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driven business.  Much can be learned from the value of their services during HA/DR 
operations and the financial expense at which the state or federal government pays for 
such emergency response services. 
B. KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED 
Knowledge Value Added (KVA) is a framework for measuring the value of 
corporate knowledge assets. Rooted in the knowledge economy, this framework provides 
several business valuation tools that can be used by companies to measure the value of 
knowledge embedded in company core processes, technology, and employees. The 
reason for KVA’s growing acceptance as a valid measurement tool lies in its theoretical 
foundation and its ease of use for companies competing in the evolving knowledge-
intensive global business environment.  
KVA methodology provides a way to measure the value of knowledge assets 
deployed in core processes objectively. Valuation, the measurement of the value of 
knowledge in company core processes, technology, and employees, is accomplished 
through two return ratios: return on knowledge (ROK) and return on process (ROP). The 
numerator of the ratio represents the percentage of the revenue or sales dollar allocated to 
the amount of knowledge required to complete a given process successfully, in 
proportion to the total amount of knowledge required to generate the corporation’s total 
outputs. The denominator of the ratio is the cost to execute the process knowledge.51 
Return on Knowledge (ROK) can be determined in two different manners. First, 
you can measure the amount of knowledge, when applied to a process, produces the 
outputs of that process. The output may be a product, or a service. Second, you can 
measure the cost of acquiring the knowledge and applying it to produce the output. The 
major difference between this measurement and traditional methodologies is that KVA is 
concerned with the cost of acquiring and applying knowledge, not just with the costs 
associated with what is used to produce a product or service.52 
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By applying KVA to a process you can determine the association of knowledge to 
value for an entire activity. KVA produces a common unit of knowledge that serves as a 
surrogate for units of output in a standard way.53 
In order to understand the concept of KVA one must first understand the 
assumptions that are the basis of the process. Using the below assumptions, KVA can 
show that knowledge can be used as substitutes for value when value is created by a 




Figure 18.   KVA Assumptions (From Thomas Housel) 
 
A pillar of KVA is Learning Time. The amount of knowledge in a process can be 
represented as the amount of time necessary for the average person to learn how to 
complete the process correctly. On average, using a common individual as a reference 
point, learning time is proportionate to the amount of knowledge learned. Learning time 
can be used as a common-sense indicator of the amount of knowledge within a given 
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process. SMEs for a given process can provide good estimates of the learning time 
required for a given process based on formal and informal training times, experience on 
the job, employee interviews, training manuals, and programs.54 KVA makes possible the 
initial estimate for allocating revenue or sales dollars to the various core processes or 
functional areas. The goal is to establish relative orders of magnitude for the amount of 
knowledge embedded in core processes so that an analyst can determine which processes 
are more valuable or important than others.55 
This approach may be used to estimate the amount of knowledge contained in IT. 
Mangers must focus on IT outputs in a core process and then use an SME to estimate the 
time necessary to learn how to manually generate the same output. An easier way to think 
of this is to ask the SME to imagine that we have just removed all of the IT and must now 
reproduce the outputs by teaching the average person to produce them manually. What 
must be determined is the learning-time estimate of how long it would take a person to 
learn to produce the given outputs.  
The actual time it takes to execute the subprocess is a flow-based estimate of its 
cost. KVA calculates the cost of a process in a new way by providing a cost-per-
equivalent-unit output and described as a unit of knowledge.56 
C. FINDINGS 
1. Private Ambulance Service Providers (AMR) 
The information gathered for this section is aimed to help determine the value of 
having commercial ambulance services available on-scene of the actual disaster to 
provide medical transport and immediate patient care.  The sources accounting for and 
data collected from AMR, the first guideline business selection, were dated from late-
1990 to mid-2006.  As discussed in Section A of this chapter, AMR is the country’s 
leading provider of medical transportation and is locally operated in 36 states and the 
District of Columbia.   
 
                                                 
54 Thomas Housel, . "KVA." Naval Postgraduate School. Monterey, CA. 15 FEB 2006. 
55 "Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) Methodology." IEC On-Line Education. 2005. International 
Engineering Consortium. 18 Sep 2006 <http://www.iec.org/online/tutorials/kva/topic01.html>. 
56 Ibid. 
46 
a. Levels of Service in Crisis 
As the skill requirements for various medical professions continue to 
increase, the differentials between the levels of care from ambulance service providers 
are becoming increasingly vague.57  Skills that were once reserved for physicians are now 
routinely performed by paramedics and skills once reserved for paramedics, such as 
defibrillation, are now routinely performed by EMT-Basics.  Furthermore, there is wide 
state-to-state, and sometimes county-to-county, variation of what types of medical care 
providers at different levels are allowed to provide.  That said, the following are the 
different levels of care service:58 
• Certified First Responder (CFR) – Usually consist of personnel in a rural 
setting in which ambulance transport is delayed due to distance. In these 
cases, responders render very basic first aid to include oxygen 
administration to patients until a more definitive transport unit arrives.  
• Basic Life Support (BLS) – Usually consists of two EMT-Basics and 
provides oxygen therapy, splinting, bleeding control, defibrillation with an 
AED and light extrication (i.e. – removing a victim from a car, but not 
using the Jaws of Life).  
• Intermediate Life Support (ILS) – Usually consists of an EMT-Basic and 
an EMT-Intermediate.  EMT-Intermediates provide BLS care with the 
addition of IV therapy and often intubation.  
• Advanced Life Support (ALS) – Usually consists of an EMT-Basic or 
EMT-Intermediate and an EMT-paramedic. EMT-paramedics provide 
BLS care and ILS care with the addition of manual defibrillation and 
advanced electrical therapy including transcutaneous pacing (i.e. – fitting 
a temporary pacemaker to the patient's chest) and synchronized 
cardioversion (an advanced form of defibrillation), intubation, medication 
administration, pleural (chest) decompression and more.  
• Mobile Intensive Care Unit (MICU) – Usually consist of either an EMT 
and a paramedic (or multiple paramedics) and provide the full range of 
advanced services to include IV therapy, cardiac monitoring and drugs, 
pain killers, etc.  In some locations, physicians may be included. 
• Critical Care Units (CCU) – Usually consist of a combination of 
EMTs/Paramedics/Nurses/Physicians depending on the need and service. 
They may provide special transports for premature babies, cardiac 
transfers, etc. 
                                                 




Depending on certain county-to-county variation requirements, AMR, 
being a well-established company, is capable of providing as high as CCU services for 
HA/DR events.  They were involved in multi-state, long-term rescue and recovery efforts 
of victims at the World Trade Center during 9/11.  In addition, AMR was Oklahoma 
City’s contracted provider during the 1995 Murrah Federal Building bombing with 
company paramedics and EMTs first on the scene to rescue and treat victims.59 
b. Resources and Capabilities 
According to AMR’s official website, the company has the following 
resources and capabilities and offers the following services and benefits: 60 
• Leadership – In crisis situations, AMR provides experienced leadership in 
the medical field.  The men and women who make up AMR’s leadership 
have an extraordinary combined depth of experience and knowledge that 
brings an understanding and creativeness to a HA/DR situations.  Some of 
the team leaders began their careers as either paramedics or EMTs and 
worked their way up the corporate ladder, while others held executive 
positions in the healthcare industry. 
• Personnel and Staff Support – Over 75% of AMR’s 18,000 employees are 
in medical and support positions that work directly in patient and customer 
care.  The remainder of the employees share in the mission of clinical and 
customer service by supporting the front-line teams.  Their depth and 
resource strength are considered unmatched in the medical transportation 
service industry.  AMR paramedics, EMTs and other professionals 
transport nearly 4 million patients nationwide each year.   
• Nation-wide Locations – With locations across the country, AMR 
provides the strength of a national company with the service of locally 
managed community operations.  Headquartered in Greenwood Village, 
CO, AMR serves more than 250 communities in both western and eastern 
regions. 
• The East region has local operations in Alabama, Connecticut, 
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina and Virginia.  This region employs more than 7,000 
healthcare professionals and support staff and is headquartered in 
New Haven, Connecticut. 
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• The West Region has local operations in Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, 
New Mexico Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, 
Washington and Wyoming.  This region employs more than 
11,000 professionals, serves more than 5.8 million people each 
year and is headquartered in Livermore, CA. 
• Partnership with Local Agencies – AMR works with private and public 
partners, including other ambulance service providers, hospitals, fire and 
police departments, to provide public safety and care. For example, police 
and fire professionals may be first responders to an incident with AMR 
partnering to provide medical care and transport the victim(s).  EmCare, 
an AMR partner, is involved by staffing more than 4,000 emergency room 
physicians across the nation who standby to treat patients in crisis.  
Additionally, AMR dispatchers/crews remain in constant radio and phone 
communication with the local police/fire dispatch center. 
• Technology Advanced Equipment – They include the following: 
• New Global Positioning System (GPS) systems that allow better 
tracking of all ambulances in the area and new Pinpoint Computer-
Aided Dispatch (CAD) systems that are designed to ensure more 
sophisticated system tracking/reporting capabilities.  These 
technological benefits lead to smoother transfer of patient calls, 
response and care. 
• State-of-the-art clinical equipment that can have a positive effect 
on cardiac arrest survival rates. 
• Support equipment to support basic ambulance services, 9-1-1 
emergency responses skills, helicopter rescues on mountains or at 
sea and rescues at major sporting events (NFL, NASCAR, etc.). 
These resources and capabilities were demonstrated during AMR’s 
involvement in the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts.  They set an off-site command center 
to manage the deployment of AMR ambulances from other operations and to coordinate 
response efforts with federal, state and local authorities.  During the aftermath of Katrina 
and Hurricane Rita, AMR deployed more than 100 out of state ambulances and medical 
crews to coastal Mississippi, southern Louisiana and eastern Texas.61  The private 
company maintained the majority of that fleet for several weeks, providing emergency 
medical services and patient evacuation.  Of course, with most profit-driven businesses, 
these services came with a fee to the government and, ultimately, taxpayers. 
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c. FEMA Contracts 
When Katrina hit the Gulf Coast at the end of August 2005 and the 
regional devastation received world-wide attention, Congress quickly passed the 
emergency appropriations bills totaling $62.3B.  The amount was allocated as follows:62 
• $60B to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for 
recovery efforts that include aid to families, debris removal and public 
assistance. 
• $1.9B to the DoD for evacuation, repairs and deploying personnel. 
• $400M to the Army Corps of Engineers for restoring and repairing New 
Orleans levees and pumping stations. 
According to a contract data listing from the Taxpayers for Common Sense 
website, an independent/non-partisan source, FEMA awarded AMR eight contracts in 
support of Hurricane Katrina totaling about $16.56M.  Table 8 lists the contracted AMR 
divisional offices, individual contract costs, dates and contract details.63  However, this 
$16.56M total of combined contracts is considered minor in comparison to what 
happened the following year.  
After a nation-wide bid in 2006, FEMA awarded AMR, along with 
another company, ACADIAN, a contract to provide emergency medical transportation 
and para-transit evacuation services for the city of New Orleans and 12 coastal Louisiana 
parishes for any disaster that requires federal evacuation assistance.64  Within 24 hours of 
notification, the federal government could task order these two emergency transportation 
providers to provide up to 488 ambulances and para-transit vehicles capable of moving 
nearly 5,400 special need evacuees within 72 hours.  The value of this dual contract for 
emergency services is $265M and is effective from 14 August through 30 November 
2006 (approximately 16 weeks), with optional short term extensions if necessary.65   
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AMR’s financial records are not publicly accessible, thus, this research was limited in 
providing an accurate dollar amount of profits the company benefited from Katrina and 
Rita. 
 
City State  K Value  Competition Date Contract Details 
Miami FL  $     806,000 
Not Full/Open - 
Other 10/1/2005 Ambulance Services 
Clarkston GA  $     430,080 
Not Full/Open - 
Other 9/27/2005 
8 (AFS) Advance Life 
Support Ambulances for 30 
Day Support 
Clarkston GA  $     921,600   9/27/2005 
Staffed w/ fully licensed 
techs/8 (AFS Advance Life 
Support Ambulances for 30 
Day Support 
New 
Haven CT  $  2,373,120   12/7/2005 
Staffed with fully Licensed 
Techs Ambulances in support 
of moving evacuees from 
hospitals, care centers, etc. 
Livermore CA  $  2,915,800 
Full/Open 
Competition 9/4/2005 
Katrina disaster support 
CCR/DUNS number required. 
Pontiac MI  $     322,560 
Full/Open 
Competition 10/3/2005 Katrina disaster support. 
Pontiac MI  $     322,561 
Full/Open 
Competition 10/14/2005 Katrina disaster support. 
Pontiac MI  $     691,200 
Full/Open 
Competition 9/4/2005 
Katrina disaster relief- 
Ambulance service in 
Gulfport, MS 
New 
Haven CT  $    (122,880) Not Competed 10/14/2005 
Katrina disaster relief- 
Ambulance service in 
Gulfport, MS 
New 
Haven CT  $     648,960 Not Competed 11/26/2005 
Katrina disaster relief- 
Ambulance service in 
Gulfport, MS 
New 
Haven CT  $  1,148,160 Not Competed 12/16/2005 
Katrina disaster relief- 
Ambulance service in 
Gulfport, MS 
New 
Haven CT  $  1,497,600 Not Competed 11/1/2005 
Katrina disaster relief- 
Ambulance service in 
Gulfport, MS 
New 
Haven CT  $  2,304,000 Not Competed 9/27/2005 
Katrina disaster relief- 
Ambulance service in 
Gulfport, MS 
New 
Haven CT  $  2,304,000 Not Competed 9/28/2005 
Katrina disaster relief- 
Ambulance service in 
Gulfport, MS 






d. Public Concerns 
In late-1990, AMR was under public speculation due to complaints from 
Shelton, CT to Sunnyvale, CA.  The privatized company was under the pressure to 
improve its level of performance and explain specific tragedies involving AMR 
ambulances that took excessive time in responding to emergency calls.  While 
acknowledging financial strains from a six-year acquisition binge, in which AMR 
absorbed more than 200 companies to become the nation's largest ambulance firm, they 
denied compromising their care for patients.66   
In contrary, AMR made arguing statements that their attempts to save 
money by laying off hundreds of employees, reducing budgets and renegotiating or 
dropping 911 contracts, have given the company greater flexibility to improve services.  
They further argued the enormous size of their nation-wide company makes them 
susceptible to criticism.  AMR claimed that as they consolidated ambulance companies, 
there were occasional service complaints towards those companies in the past but were 
then directed against AMR after their takeover.  Thus, there was the appearance that one 
large firm was overall responsible for a series of past problems and complains for the 
smaller, overtaken companies.67 
2. Private Firefighters (GF) 
Similar to the previous section, the data collected for the second guideline 
business selection is aimed to help determine the value of having private firefighters 
supplement municipal response agencies in battling wildfires.  The sources accounting 
for and data collected from GF were dated from late-1990 to mid-2006.  Again, GF is an 
Oregon-based private company that provides multiple contract services, including 
firefighting crews, portable showers, fire engines and helicopters that assist the U.S. 
Forest Service and other firefighting government agencies.   
a. Emergency Services in Wildfires 
Contract firefighting crews are concentrated primarily in the Pacific 
Northwest, northern California and the Colorado Rocky Mountain region.  The Pacific 
Northwest Wildfire Coordinating Group, administered by the Oregon Department of                                                  
66 Liz Halloran, “Firm Puts Squeeze on 911 Service in Drive for Profits, AMR Whittles Ambulance 
Standards,” The Hartford Courant, State of Emergency Second of two parts, 18 JAN 1999 
67 Ibid 
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Forestry, and the Forest Service's National Firefighter Crew Contract provide the 
majority of these privatized crews.68 
Since 1982, GF has been contracted by various federal and state agencies, 
as well as many private companies, to battle fires throughout the mentioned regions.  
They performed wildfire suppression services on over 400 incidents, where more than 
25% of these incidents were initial attack type.69  The goal of GF is to provide the 
various governmental agencies, commercial industries and private landowners with 
professional, fully-equipped and trained workforces for fire suppression and emergency 
service crews. 
b. Resources and Capabilities 
With local offices in the states of Oregon, Idaho and Montana, GF is 
headquartered in Grants Pass, OR and currently employs 150 full time employees and 
peak up to 450 in the summer season.  The services of this private company include 30 
engines, 4 water tenders, 15 Twenty-Person crews, 2 mobile shower units, 3 track 
engines, 2 potable water trucks and a type 3 helicopter among other resources. 
GF has been incorporated in the State of Oregon since 1979 specializing in 
wildfire suppression, fuels management and emergency services.  The following are GF 
resources that support these specializations:70 
• Type 2 Crews 
• Type 2 IA Crews 
• Type 6 4x4 Engines 
• Type 4 4x4 Engines – In case of road closures or poor access, these 
machines are essential for landscape prescribed burns. 
• Type 3 Tenders 
• Skidgine Track Machines (FMC’s) 
• Dozer 
                                                 
68 Dininny, Shannon. "Report finds Forest Service must strengthen oversight of contract firefighters." 
SignOnSanDiego.com. 21 MAR 2006. SignOnSanDiego.com. 18 Sep 2006 
<http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/20060321-2329-wst-firefightertraining.html>. 
69 "Wildfire Experience." Grayback Forestry, INC. Grayback Forestry, Inc. 18 Sep 2006 
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• 3000 gal. Potable Water Trucks 
• Prescribe Burn Teams 
• Class C Fellers - Miscellaneous Overhead Positions 
• Mobile Shower Units 
• Mobile Sinks 
• Training Cadre 
• Burn Bosses and Overhead Positions 
GF uses the Type 6 engines, type 4 engines and tenders to accommodate 
multiple burns and mop-up operations.  All the engines have foam injection systems.  The 
tenders are tactical tenders with 3000 gallon capacity and have foam injection, monitors 
and high-pressure pumps for added effectiveness.  Additionally, GF has 4-wheel drive 
quads that increase efficiency for packing fuel and mop-up operations on burn projects. 
One of the 4-wheel drive quads can carry 1,500 pounds of water or fuel. 71 
c. Cost to the Government 
GF bills the government between $25 and $30 dollars per hour and per 
crewmember.  On an average of ten-hour days, this totals to about $5K to $6K a day for 
each private firefighting crew.72  If all 15 crews are contracted for a major wildfire, the 
government could pay as high as $90K per ten-hour day.  This amount can increase if the 
work hours exceed ten-hours on any or all of the wildfire suppression days.  Additionally, 
one of GF’s fire engines and a three-man crew rents for about $100 per hour.73  This 
could cost the government an additional $1K per ten-hour day or even more for extended 
hours. 
On another note, private firefighters do not make as much money during 
non-fire seasons.  “During fire season you learn to put away some money for that slow 
time,” said Grayback crew boss Will Howell, 24, who had only nine days fighting fire in 
2004, a low turnout year for wildfires.  “You look at the last three years (2001-2003), 
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<http://www.graybackforestry.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=9>. 
72 Geoffrey F. Sefal, "Private Firefighters Battle the West's Wildfires." Reason Public Policy Institute. 
30 OCT 2003. reason.org. 18 Sep 2006 <http://www.rppi.org/privatefirefighters.shtml>. 
73 Ibid 
54 
they were incredible seasons.  We’d start in May or June. The average season we start in 
mid-July. That throws you for a loop when you get used to that.”74 
d. Public Concerns 
There are separate concerns regarding GF and the private firefighting 
industry.  The GF concern is based on the level of service their crews provide during 
major burns. In 2003, GF deployed their maximum 15 twenty-person crews to help battle 
the western wildfires.  Although these crews were trained in safety and building fire lines, 
they were not fielded to dangerous spots like the lead edge of a wildfire.75  This means 
that civic firefighting agencies must fill this voided requirement. 
The first concern regarding the private firefighting industry is based on a 
recent report by the inspector-general for the U.S. Forest Service that states illegal 
immigrants have been fighting fires as privatized crews for several years.  About half of 
the estimated 5,000 private firefighters, based in the Pacific Northwest and contracted by 
state and federal governments, are immigrants mostly from Mexico.76  The number of 
these immigrants working illegally is not disclosed.  The state of Oregon, which 
administers private fire contracts for the Forest Service, imposed tougher rules on 
companies that employ firefighters, including a requirement that firefighting crew leaders 
have a working command of English and a formal business location where crew members 
can assemble.77 
The other concern is the perception of unethical acts of arson to ensure 
jobs/contracts for private firefighting crews.  Unlike publicly employed municipal 
firefighters, private contract wild-land firefighters are paid only while they are battling 
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fires.  Federal policies favoring private firefighters over public agency firefighters have 
sharply increased both suppression costs in the 1990's and arson incidents.78   
3. KVA Calculations 
Section B of this chapter described that a process is knowledge that is stored in 
the people and expert systems of a process.  The value of this knowledge is not easily 
understood until a key person is removed from the process or the expert system is 
removed from the process.  If a division has a person that is so experienced in his job that 
no one else can perform that job in the event that they are not able to come into work for 
a day. This will hinder the workflow of that division.  Single points of failure in an expert 
system or the personnel in a process highlight how valuable their knowledge or ability is.  
The value of knowledge or KVA is measured using Learning Time.79 
This measurement provides a valuable number for the Return on Knowledge 
(ROK) equation.  In order to understand ROK, with respect to LT, knowledge must be 
defined in a particular way.  “It is the know-how required to produce process outputs.”80  
Knowledge is proportionate to how long it takes to learn that thing.  Learning time is a 
convenient method for measuring knowledge in a system.  In an application to the Navy, 
a maintenance technician will take three months to qualify or learn the 3M maintenance 
system and another two months to qualify on the equipment that the technician will be 
performing maintenance on.  The costs associated with the sailor taking five months to 
qualify to perform maintenance on a piece of equipment is a know quantity.  The total 
cost of the process of qualifying to perform maintenance can be now be defined.  Using 
LT as a surrogate for the return in a ROI problem we can now define this ratio as a 
ROK.81  In this example, the ratio would be described as: 
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K/C = ROK 
K = Knowledge allocated to Revenue82 
C = total cost 
Using ROK we can now define value of knowledge in the maintenance process or 
the KVA to the process.  This example can be illustrated by applying this procedure to an 
aggregate or enterprise level and processes are measured in the aggregate.83  Table 9 
demonstrates an aggregate KVA analysis of the Thailand Field Experiment.  This table 
was derived by interviewing the process owners and obtaining average learning-time 
estimates and a rough estimate of the number of process instructions to complete the 
process.   
From Table 9 column descriptions: 
• Subprocess: Identified by the COASTS leadership team 
• Number of Employees within each Subprocess 
• Times Fired is how many times the Subprocess is completed for each 
evolution of the greater process 
• Nominal Learning Time is how long it would take the average person to 
learn to do the Subprocess 
• IT % is an estimate of % that Subprocess is automated. Used to determine 
values for column 8. 
• Total Learning Time (process instructions) allocated to each Subprocess 
that is automated. Derived from: 
Column 6 x Column 7 + Column 6 = Total Knowledge 
• Percentage of Knowledge Allocation (KA): This value is taken from the 
Total Knowledge per Core Area and its percentage of the Total 
Knowledge for the Enterprise: 
Example: Remote Clients   
1680/8382   =   20.04% 
• Allocation of Total Revenue to Knowledge or simply the KVA to each 
core area. This value is derived by taking the total revenue and 
multiplying it by KA from column 9. This is the numerator in the ROK 
equation 
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• Annual Expense is simply the denominator in the ROK equation. 
• ROK per Subprocess. 
From this analysis one can see that the Subprocess that has the lowest ROK is the 
setup of the 802.16 back-haul network.  Consequently, the other data in the analysis 
validates this.  It takes the longest amount of time and it is one of the lowest in terms of 
the percentage of Knowledge embedded in automation.  This is an area that would be 
among the first to study for redesigning.  How much of this core area can actually be 
automated?  The overall effect of embedding knowledge in automation or in an IT system 
creates substantial changes in the way we do business.  Unfortunately, not all processes 
are able to have an IT system embedded into them to improve the process. 
 

























A. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
1. Field Experiments 
a. 2006 COASTS Networks Testing 
The COASTS field experiment is an on-going research project based at 
the NPS.  The COASTS field experimentation program supports U.S.Commander Pacific 
Fleet (COMPACFLT), Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-W), Joint U.S. 
Military Advisory Group Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI), NPS, Royal Thai Armed Forces 
(RTARF), and the Thai Department of Research & Development Office (DRDO) science 
and technology research requirements relating to theater and national security, counter-
drug and law enforcement missions, and the Global War On Terror (GWOT)84. 
The COASTS program was designed to integrate the technological 
expertise of NPS’s education and research resources with the potential operational 
requirements, science and technology of the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) using WLAN 
technologies to fuse and to display information from air and ground sensors to a real-
time, multi-level, coalition enabled command and control center. Using COTS 
technologies, the COASTS research program intended to demonstrate the capacity of 
coalition communications in an operational context.85 
The network that was designed for COASTS 2006 supported real-time 
video, integrated sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles and situational awareness tools from 
802.11 a/g mesh and IEEE 802.16 PtMP devices. The backbone link of IEEE 802.16 
point-to-point suites was used to link the RTAF Wing 411 communications station to the 
Royal Thai Army (RTA) Inter-agency Intelligence Fusion Center (IIFC) and to the Mae 
Ngat Dam area of operations (AO).86 
At the Mae Ngat Dam AO, various sensors were integrated into this 
system of systems to create a tactical network architecture. In an IEEE 802.11g mesh 
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WiFi cloud, various sensors and clients were integrated into the network. Unattended 
ground sensors, IP cameras, UAV’s, biometric devices, as well as various client 
applications and hardware, were enabled through the network.  
The COASTS 2006 scenario was intended to test the use of commercial, 
off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment and procedures that: (1) potentially reduce or mitigate 
drug trafficking across the Thai-Burma border, (2) provide actionable information (real-
time) to local, regional, and strategic level decision-makers, and (3) shorten the sensor-to-
shooter cycle.87  The 802.11 network performed as designed in all aspects and Measures 
of Effectiveness (MOE) created.  The entire AO was under the coverage area of the WiFi 
cloud during the duration of the field experiment.88 
(1)  UAV’s.  The UAV’s performed with mixed results.  The most 
common problems encountered with using the UAV’s during the Thailand Field 
Experiment was the lack of flight training prior to the deployment and quantity of spare 
parts for each UAV.  Due to funding issues caused because the federal budget was not 
passed in a timely manner, the UAV’s were not purchased until shortly before the 
Thailand Field Experiment.  More training time with the UAV’s prior to deployment 
would have greatly increased the value of the UAV’s since the pilots would have had 
more training time and a better understanding of the spare parts required for prolonged 
field activity would have been available.  Additionally, the UAV’s chosen for this year 
had significant endurance problems.  There was no UAV that had a combination of high 
endurance and high reliability of parts that allowed significant testing of MOE’s.  The use 
of UAV’s did allow for aerial sensors to be deployed and WAP’s to be sent airborne to 
extend the WiFi cloud.89 
(2)  802.16.  The WiMax network worked as designed.  With the 
exception of the link from the AO to the next tower in the multi-hop trip to Wing 411, all 
hops were able to transmit at 48 MBps.  The link from the AO was only able to transmit 
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at 6 MBps.  With more time and the availability of different antenna configurations, all 
WiMax hops would be able to transmit at 48 MBps.90 
(3)  Balloons.  The balloon payload was constructed using an AN-
50M Redline terminal powered by two UBI-2590 batteries with a single 12 dBi omni 
directional antenna.  A Sony PTZ camera was installed for ISR functionality.  The 
payload was connected to a tethered balloon with a lift capacity of 66 lbs.  The combined 
payload weighed 28 lbs.  The payload was launched from an island approximately 1.2 
miles from the TOC.  A 17 dBi 90 degree sector antenna was manually aimed from the 
TOC to the balloon payload, forming a strong Point to Point connection.  The 
configuration of the aerial 802.16 allowed a connection of greater than 6 MBps 
throughput to be maintained from launch to the final flight altitude of 4000 feet.  At that 
altitude, the slant range exceeded 1.8 miles, while passing over 36 MBps data throughput.  
The ISR performance was only limited to the capability of the camera platform.  The 
camera platform was susceptible to movements of the balloon taking the target of interest 
out of view.  The battery life of the UBI-2590s allowed for 6 hours of flight operations.  
For actual field deployment, the development of longer lasting power sources is needed.91 
(4)  Power Supply.  Identified as a single point of failure, an 
adequate, autonomous power supply is a topic that must be addressed prior to COASTS 
2007.  The reliance on host nation power sources proved to be problematic.  The power 
that was provided by the host nation was not a sufficient uninterruptible power supply.  
This caused power surges during testing and the final field experiment.  Additionally, 
power loads at the TOC were not evenly distributed causing down time due to circuit 
breakers popping.  More gas powered generators and Uninterruptible Power Supply 
(UPS) boxes would solve many of these problems.92 
b. 2004 GGSN Homeland Security Exercise 
The purpose of using the PacketHop solution, as utilized during GGSN’s 
Homeland Security field exercise, as a comparable application to HFNs, if utilized for 
military HA/DR operations, was to prove whether or not a commercial communication 
                                                 




systems could improve the C2 capabilities for various response agencies.  If a comparable 
system tested successful, then maybe such a C2 solution could benefit the DoD.  Various 
sources have stated the 2004 GGSN Homeland Security field exercise was a successful 
experiment and that the PacketHop solution was a proven communication system. 
As demonstrated in a live field exercise, PacketHop was able to achieve 
mobile broadband connectivity across tough terrain – on land and water – 
and over mobile, infrastructure-less networks for more than ten multi-
jurisdiction agencies.  This exercise was unquestionably an important 
milestone in driving the Golden Gate Safety Network closer to its vision to 
develop and implement a regional communications system that supports a 
multi-agency response from local, state and federal first responders for 
day-to-day operations and incident management.93 
- Michael Griffin, Assistant Chief, CGOES  
The tested software solution delivered instantaneous mobile broadband 
connectivity, providing GGSN agencies with situational awareness in the field.  While 
focusing “efforts on the famed Golden Gate Bridge and surrounding waterways and 
national parks, dozens of first responders representing 13 multi-jurisdictional agencies 
were able to instantly communicate and share mission-critical broadband data across 
diverse devices, difficult terrain and dissimilar networks.”94  The success of the 
PacketHop solution for the Homeland Security field exercise should be a revelation to the 
DoD, where commercial technology could allow military activities advanced C2 
capabilities in rural HA/DR situations, such as the December 2004 tsunami in Indonesia. 
An assumption of this research was that an effective HFN would provide 
significant benefits to military response units in HA/DR operations.  Based on various 
sources, the PacketHop system tested successful in providing advanced C2 capabilities to 
multi-agency responders.  So if this solution is a comparable application to an “effective 
HFN,” then the DoD should invest in HFN technology and equipment, correct?  The 
answer depends on what requirements actually constitute an effective HFN?  For the 
purposes of this study, an effective HFN is a communication system that provides the 
                                                 
93 Michele Spring, Thornton, Laurie. "PacketHop Deploys First Multi-Agency, Mission-Critical, 
Mobile Broadband Communications Network For Homeland Security." Mayfield Fund - PacketHop. 25 
FEB 2004. Mayfield Fund. 18 Sep 2006 <http://www.mayfield.com/newsarticles/packethop022504.htm>. 
94 David Thompson, “Mobile Mesh Networking: Bridge to the Future of Broadband Wireless,” 
Private Wireless, Vol. 12, June/July 2004. 
63 
necessary C2 capabilities to its users anywhere and anytime.  For the most part, the HFN 
technology tested during the COASTS project were successful.  The areas that were not 
tested successful were due to several factors, including limited timing, delayed funding 
and late receipt of material prior to deployment; all of which caused limited preparations 
and pre-deployment testing.  This does not necessarily mean the HFN technology is not 
effective; it could mean that more time and future field tests are required by the COASTS 
team. 
It should be noted that the results of this 2004 field experiment, unlike the 
2006 COASTS project, was concluded well before the start of this thesis research.  The 
COASTS project in Thailand was accomplished in May 2006 and there was an 
uncertainty if the various HFN equipment would test successfully in the field.  Then 
again, the personnel involved in the COASTS project were NPS graduate students in 
comparison to the skilled, professional responders of the GGSN exercise.  Furthermore, 
the PacketHop system was developed and tested by corporate IT professionals from a 
reputable corporation, where the equipment being tested for COASTS were experimental 
systems developed from a variety of sponsoring activities.  In regards to the GGSN 
experiment, PacketHop had a reputation to uphold for providing quality service, using 
state of the art technology and being a competitive IT business.  In a financial analysis 
intended to identify benefits for the DoD, there is nothing wrong with this.  If this is what 
works, then maybe the DoD should consider this avenue in acquiring advanced C2 
systems.  
As presented in Chapter III, PacketHop’s “Communication System for 
Public Safety” software is readily available on the market.  If the DoD were to invest in 
this particular system, how much would it cost?  First, a scenario must be presented.  For 
this study, it will be a deployable military unit responding to an international CHD.  
Similar to the size of the deployed COASTS team, ten responders or end-users will be 
required for this mission.  Next, we use the estimated pricing from the company.  
PacketHop quotes approximately $2K per end-user device and the management console, 
with Gateway software, will cost about $25K.95  This totals to an estimate of $45K for 
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multicast services, supported by standard IEEE 802.11a/b/g WiFi and 4.9 GHz spectrum 
with a range of up to 1 km line of sight.  Remember, this pricing is just for one system to 
support one deploying unit.  Also, the PacketHop system is not using UAVs, which is a 
substantial cost for the technology utilized in the COASTS project.  Another option for 
the DoD is to solicit IT companies, like PacketHop, to develop a C2 solution for 
specifically satisfying military requirements.    
2. Financial Methodologies 
a. Market Comparables 
One of the frequent sources of legal confusion between cost and value is 
the tendency of courts, in common with other persons, to think of value as 
something inherent in the thing valued, rather than as an attitude of 
persons toward that thing in view of its estimated capacity to perform a 
service.96 
In lines with the DoD investing in HFNs for HA/DR purposes, the theory 
surrounding the value of this investment depends on the future benefits that will 
accumulate under ownership of the DoD.97  These future benefits could include, but are 
not limited to, the frequency commanders quickly attain management control during a 
crisis situation, improved relations with international response agencies, availability of 
service when required, cost savings to the government and/or an increased number of 
lives saved during HA/DR operations.  This market comparable analysis will focus on 
cost comparisons with the guideline business selections and the value of saving lives. 
(1)  The Cost of Emergency Responses.  The market comparable 
findings in Chapter IV provided cost figures to help link a comparison with the cost of 
HFNs.  For hurricane relief efforts in 2006, FEMA contracted for emergency 
transportation services, involving AMR, which covers 16 weeks and has a base period 
cost of $265M.  This can be translated to $16.56M per week (which is not to be confused 
with the $16.56M combined contract value that FEMA awarded to AMR in 2005).  The 
main portion of this contract is for contingency operations, which would only be executed 
upon task order of the federal government in the case of a presidential declared disaster 
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or emergency.  According to Rear Admiral Craig Vanderwagen, the Health and Human 
Services Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, "These contracts 
are an important element in insuring that assets are available to carry out this critical 
operation."  The same can be said for having available assets in the event of a major 
wildfire.  The next cost focus of this analysis is on the costs of private firefighting 
services. 
Based on the service rates provided in Chapter IV, GF bills the 
government between $25 and $30 dollars per hour and per crewmember, with an average 
of ten-hour days (about $5K to $6K a day for each private firefighting crew).  GF can 
deploy a maximum of 15 crews for a major wildfire and would cost the government as 
high as $90K per ten-hour day.  Additionally, one of GF’s fire engines and a three-man 
crew rents for about $100 per hour.98  This could cost the government an additional $1K 
per ten-hour day or even more for extended hours.  So for this analysis, the scenario shall 
be the government needs to contract GF to battle a major western wildfire that will span 
for one week or seven ten-hour work days and requires all assets the company has to 
offer.  All assets include 15 twenty-person crews and three fire engines (each including 
three-person crews).  Thus, at the rate of $30 per hour and member, with 15 twenty-
person crews and seven ten-hour days, the cost for the crews will be $630K.  The 
additional cost for the 3 fire engines, with a rate of $100 per hour, is $21K.  The total cost 
to the government would be approximately $651K.  See Table 10 for the cost-breakdown. 
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Crews 
Hourly rate per firefighter  $        30  
Firefighters per crew 20 
Number of crews requested 15
Number of working days 7
Working hours per day 10
Subtotal  $630,000  
Fire Engines 
Hourly rate per fire engine  $      100  
Number of fire engines requested 3
Number of working days 7
Working hours per day 10
Subtotal  $  21,000  
Total Cost to the Government 
15 Crews  $630,000  
3 Fire engines  $  21,000  
Total  $651,000  
Table 10.   Sample Cost-breakdown for Grayback Forestry Services 
 
This scenario amount of $651K seems inexpensive when compared 
to the $16.56M weekly value of ambulance services.  Remember, this scenario only 
involves one private company and it is not as big of a company as is AMR, who provide 
services nationwide.  Also, there can be speculation that Katrina relief has received much 
higher profiles than the western wildfires.  Wildfires are almost a routine occurrence in 
the West, but Katrina made history as one of the worst natural disasters that struck the 
nation. 
The costs for the private ambulance and firefighting services far 
exceed the costs for the COASTS Project of setting up and running an HFN at a remote 
location in Thailand.  The total cost of the COASTS Project field experiment in Thailand 
was $308K (see Chapter 3).  Furthermore, this cost can easily be reduced by over 25% if 
the UAV portion of the network is not used.  While the costs of setting up an HFN will 
vary greatly by geographical area, it is evident that establishing an HFN can be 
considered a cost effective measure to providing relief to a CHD. 
In the findings section of this thesis, AMR and GF showed they are 
both capable and reliable sources for emergency response to crisis situations.  In regards 
to hurricane relief efforts for 2006, AMR and partnering company, ACADIAN, are 
servicing the city of New Orleans and twelve coastal Louisiana parishes and providing up 
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to 488 ambulances and para-transit vehicles capable of moving nearly 5,400 special need 
evacuees.99  Although a contingent requirement, this capability is of an enormous scale 
for a private company.  The same can be said for wildfires in the west.  In 2003, Oregon-
based private firefighting companies, such as GF, have been dispatched to help out with 
wildfires in Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah and Nevada.100  The wide-scale 
capabilities of these two guideline business selections are a good market comparable to 
HFNs supporting HA/DR operations. 
Theoretically, the network cloud of an HFN could be infinitely 
large, with available bandwidth and operating terrain acting as the only constraints.  The 
HFN utilized by the COASTS team was predetermined to cover a 12 km2 OA.  This area 
of coverage, again, would cost the government $308K.  In comparison to a major 
wildfire, this 12 km2 OA coverage could be considered rather small.  This could 
somewhat justify the higher cost of $651K for the supplemental firefighting assistance of 
GF.  Plus, the government tends to pay more when property and homes are in danger 
from a wildfire.  The loss of lives would draw higher public attention than the loss of 
property, thus, hurricane relief efforts have a higher profile and price tag.  Therefore, the 
government is more willing to spend $16.56M for available assets during hurricane 
season. 
(2)  The Value of Saving Lives.  Considering the fact that private 
ambulance service providers and private firefighters share the commonality of being in 
the business of saving lives, it only seems appropriate for this analysis to measure the 
value of a human life.  But in the life-saving business, is every human being worth the 
same?  Do age, gender, race, religious preference, marital/parental status, educational 
level, working class and/or citizenship affect the value of a person?  Most likely, 
ambulance personnel, firefighters and military SAR team members may not ask victims 
too many of these personal questions when attempting to save their lives during a crisis 
situation.  Age and gender, however, may have a personal impact on certain responders, 
where they prefer to give life-saving priority to babies, children and their mother(s); 
                                                 
99 "Federal Agencies Collaborate To Aid Special Need Evacuations." FEMA. 18 AUG 2006. FEMA. 
18 Sep 2006 <http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=29021>. 
100 Geoffrey F Sefal. "Private Firefighters Battle the West's Wildfires." Reason Public Policy Institute. 
30 OCT 2003. reason.org. 18 Sep 2006 <http://www.rppi.org/privatefirefighters.shtml>. 
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hence the phrase “women and children first.”  With this in mind, it is difficult to set one 
common value to every living person.  
According to a 2002 cost-benefit analysis, assigning a monetary 
value to a living person has not been done in medicine and may be widely regarded as 
inconsistent with medical ethics.101  The economics study concluded that human 
preferences for the provision of health care or other life-saving interventions are probably 
too complex to be adequately represented by means of a single monetary value 
expressing the benefits of life-saving.  These results served as the starting point to more 
general discussions surrounding the economic value of activities designed to reduce 
human mortality.102  For this financial analysis of HFNs, the activities designed to reduce 
human mortality are military/government agencies and the market comparables (private 
ambulance service providers and firefighters).   
Now that it has been determined that not all lives can be assigned a 
single monetary value, is it safe to say that it is just as difficult, if not more, to assign 
multiple values based various considerations (i.e. – age, gender, race, religious 
preference, etc.)?  If this study were to assign multiple values based on such 
considerations, it would probably cause controversy or present indications of prejudice.  
Thus, a monetary value will not be given to a human being.  This brings the discussion 
back to how to measure the value of saving lives.  Should the federal/state government 
invest in contracting ambulance services, firefighters and network system if it means 
effectively saving lives INCONUS and OUTCONUS?  The short answer is yes and is 
supported by humanitarian ethics.   
The humanitarian ethic is about saving the lives of those in the 
greatest need.  There must be respect towards the human dignity of every man, woman 
and child whose life is or could be devastated by conflict or disaster.  Acting on this 
remains a difficult challenge for humanitarian organizations and all those with a stake in 
humanitarian crises.103  Unfortunately, humanitarian aid tends to favor high-profile 
                                                 
101 Elvik Rune, “Cost-benefit analysis of ambulance and rescue helicopters in Norway: reflections on 
assigning a monetary value to saving a human life,” National Center for Biotechnology Information, 
Institute of Transport Economics, 2002.  
102 Ibid 
103 Cherpitel, Didier. "Putting principles into practice – the key to legitimacy." IFRC. 17 JULY 2003. 
IFRC. 18 Sep 2006 <www.ifrc.org/docs/news/opinion03/03071701>. 
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emergencies at the expense of low-profile crisis suffering far from the media or political 
spotlight. “While countries targeted in the ‘War on Terror’ have attracted unprecedented 
levels of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, other – arguably more pressing – crises 
languish in the shadows.”104  HFNs deployed with the military, via air or sea, could be 
utilized to improve the effectiveness of saving lives, regardless of high or low-profile.   
b. KVA 
By measuring the amount of knowledge required for a process and then 
measuring the cost of acquiring that knowledge, the KVA approach allows you to 
determine the return on knowledge (ROK).  The benefits of the KVA methodology are 
that by comparing processes, with an ROK value for both processes, it can demonstrate 
which produces the greater value.105  This ROK can then be compared to the ROK of a 
process in similar activity.  These two processes can then be compared using their 
respective ROK values since everything has been reduced to the one common factor of 
ROK.   
In the case of the COASTS Thailand Field Experiment, by examining the 
ROK from the KVA spreadsheet, Table 9 in Chapter IV, one can see the value of 
knowledge in each of the subprocesses performed.  By concentrating on the subprocesses 
with the lowest ROK percentages and trying to improve those first, usually through an 
increase in automation, the overall process of the COASTS Thailand Field Experiment 
can be improved, incrementally, for very little capital investment.  A simple option might 
be found in the launch and recovery of the balloon subprocesses.  If there were a way to 
automate the process, instead of relying so heavily on manual labor, there would be 
immediate results for little additional capital.  A different approach can be used given the 
same data from Table 9.  If you look for subprocesses that have a high ROK value you 
can find out what is being done well in those areas to increase productivity or revenue in 
an area for the entire Enterprise.  An example is the maintenance subprocess for the TOC.  
While the learning time is somewhat higher than most of the other subprocesses for the 
Thailand Field Experiment, the IT% is higher than most of the other subprocesses.  If 
                                                 
104 Cherpitel, Didier. "Putting principles into practice – the key to legitimacy." IFRC. 17 JULY 2003. 
IFRC. 18 Sep 2006 <www.ifrc.org/docs/news/opinion03/03071701>. 
105 Thomas Housel, Arthur H. Bell, Measuring and Managing Knowledge, McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2001. 
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there were a way to use some of that IT% on other subprocesses, or capture the 
knowledge used by the people involved with that subprocess and lower the time to 
complete another similar subprocess in the entire Enterprise, the overall ROK for the 
entire Enterprise would increase.  
B. IMPLEMENTATION AND MODEL METHODOLOGY 
1. Funding and Implementation 
In case the DoD decides to invest in HFN systems to support future HA/DR 
operations, the initiative must go through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and 
Execution (PPBE) system before any money is actually spent.  The DoD uses the PPBE 
system to link defense strategy to defense resources.106  The PPBE system will determine 
if the C2 initiative becomes a part of the IT budget request submitted to the President’s 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  If approved at the OMB level, it becomes 
part of the President’s budget and is passed on to Congress.  In support of the fiscal year 
2007 budget, President George W. Bush requested $30.5 billion for the DoD’s IT budget.  
This budget request is a $100 million increase from the $30.4 billion approved by 
Congress for 2006.107  This is an example of how the DoD is emphasizing the need to 
expand IT solutions to support military transformation. 
Upon congressional approval, the C2 initiative officially becomes a budgeted 
priority for the DoD and the obligation of funding is authorized.  The defense allocation, 
which was determined by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and OMB prior 
to budget submittal, is distributed among the U.S. military services.  The concern is 
whether or not sufficient IT/C2 support funding was properly allocated to the appropriate 
branch of military service.  There tends to be a common belief that the military services 
have an equal share of defense spending, but this not true.  Based on a study of 1980 to 
2009 financial figures, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps use about 30% of the DoD 
budget, Air Force uses about 30%, Army about 25% and defense-wide agencies about 
                                                 
106 Julian R. Roberts, Jr., DAU Teaching Note: PPBE Process, December 2003 pg 14 and Lecture 
Slide for Defense Resource Allocation, MN3331: Principles of Systems Acquisition and Program 
Management. 
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15%.108  Rather than discussing all the services, this analysis will focus on the operational 
forces of the Navy and adding the IT/C2 initiative to the fleet’s mission capabilities. 
The Navy is America’s forward deployed force, major deterrence against hostile 
aggression and emergency response organization to crisis around the world.  There are 
Carrier and/or Expeditionary Strike Groups (CSG/ESGs) stationed or deployed 
worldwide and these naval forces will most likely be responsible for using HFN systems 
in HA/DR operations overseas.  As the four-star head of the Navy, the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) would be the decision-maker to implement this HFN capability fleet-
wide.  The operational chain of command from senior to subordinate is the CNO, the 
Fleet Commanders (CPF for Pacific Fleet and CLF for Atlantic Fleet), the Type 
Commanders (i.e.- COMNAVAIRPAC, COMNAVSURFPAC and COMNAVSUBPAC) 
and the CSG/ESG. 
The CSG/ESG would be the user activity of the HFN systems and a designated 
government contracting agency would be the purchasing activity.  The designated Head 
of Contracting Activity (HCA) for the Navy is Naval Supply Systems Command 
(NAVSUP), whose primary mission is to provide supply support to the fleet.109  
NAVSUP would assign the lead Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC), COMFISC 
San Diego, to designate one of their contracting offices to initiate an open-bid solicitation 
for HA/DR C2 solutions.  The contract would be awarded based on best value and the 
winning bidder’s HFN solution must satisfy the criteria for supporting Navy missions 
involving HA/DR requirements.  The acquired HFN systems and components would be 
received in units of packages or “pack-up kits” (PUKs), with each unit stored inside 
transportable containers or CONEX boxes.  Each PUK would consist of software, 
hardware and support equipment necessary to provide HFN capabilities for HA/DR field 
operations.  The user activities of these PUKs must ensure sufficient personnel obtain the 
qualifications for trainer, operator and organizational-level maintenance.   
                                                 
108 Philip J. Candreva (Editor), Practical Financial Management: A Handbook for the Defense 
Department Financial Manager, January 2005, pg 25.  
109 "Naval Supply Systems Command." NAVSUP. NAVSUP. 18 Sep 2006 
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Upon receiving its share of PUKs, COMPACFLT would then distribute them 
accordingly to the Type Commanders (TYCOMs).  COMNAVSURFPAC (CNSP) would 
provide PUKs to ESGs that are deployed/deploying and engaged/engaging in the training 
work-up cycle.  USS TARAWA (LHA-1), a naval vessel from ESG-1, would receive a 
PUK from CNSP prior to their work-up cycle or deployment.  As the accountable 
command, TARAWA is authorized to use the HFN to support HA/DR operations within 
the Contiguous U.S. (CONUS) or outside (OUTCONUS).  Sample scenarios include, but 
are not limited to, tsunami SAR missions, volcano eruption recovery efforts and 
emergency responses to major terrorist attacks.  Upon completion of the deployment, 
TARAWA will return the PUK to CNSP who will then distribute to another ESG as 
appropriate.  The PUKs will undergo a cycle of storage, maintenance and issue for years 
to come. 
2. Model Methodology 
As mentioned previously in this chapter, if the Navy decided to deploy HFNs in 
response to HA/DR operations it would do so in the form of a PUK.  This PUK should 
have the following characteristics that were determined during the COASTS 2006 Field 
Experiments and operational testing. 
By definition, a PUK is mobile.  This PUK would need to be placed on a ship or 
cargo plane for rapid deployment in the event of a HA/DR.  The gear for the HFN would 
be packaged and containerized in some form of rugged, mobile shipping container that 
could be transported from ship to a landing zone by helicopter or LCAC.  If the PUK is 
flown into an OA it would then need to be placed on a truck or transported by helicopter 
for the “last mile” into the affected area. 
Another requirement is that the HFN, in the form of a PUK, would have to be 
entirely autonomous.  Assuming that the HFN is deployed to an area that would have 
been devastated by some form of disaster, either natural or man made, the infrastructure 
of the area would not be able to support any requirements of the HFN.  Upon 
deployment, the HFN should be self sustaining; only relying on predetermined logistical 
help from the deploying ship or air station.  This would include fuel for generators, 
batteries and battery charging facilities, any necessary cables and wires, tools for 
assembly of the HFN, lodging (tents), water, food, etc. 
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3. Scalability 
Finally, a key concept to an HFN is its scalability.  By design, an HFN is 
infinitely scalable.  The only constraints are available bandwidth and the terrain that it is 
operating in.  The HFN used by COASTS for the Thailand Field Experiment would not 
work for anything much larger than the predetermined 12 km2 OA.  If the Navy were to 
try and establish an HFN in Indonesia in response to the tsunami of December, 2004, 
several containers of gear would be needed to support multiple locations spread along 
hundreds of miles of coastline.  There would be a predetermined make-up of each 
container that would make up a deployed PUK for the HFN.  If there was only a small 
HFN needed, one container could be deployed.  If the need was greater than a deployed 
force could handle, more containers could be flown into the area from CONUS to 
supplement the PUK that would be deployed from a ship.  There would also be a 
predetermined supply chain and logistical support for the various sizes of the HFNs 
deployed.  This would be broken down into categories such as; the number of personnel 
needed to support the HFN, bandwidth required by the area affected, total footprint 
(electric and physical size of the HFN and supporting activity) allowed in the OA, 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are the Financial Implications Using HFNs in a Remote Or 
Devastated Operating Area?  
The financial costs associated with operating an HFN in a remote or devastated 
area can be easily determined.  By taking the cost of purchasing all of the necessary 
equipment to build a HFN, adding the cost of maintenance and storage of the purchased 
equipment plus all of the personnel costs, one can come up with a cost to operate an HFN 
in any location and to any scale needed.  The difficult part of the equation is determining 
the benefit gained by the implementation of the HFN in the remote or devastated area.  
Without the HFN, there may be no communications in the affected area.  That means that 
first responders and relief agencies would have no means of communicating with anyone 
out of shouting distance.  The implications of not providing the necessary communication 
equipment, if available, could result in a greater loss of life due to the limited capabilities 
of the relief efforts being wasted or misdirected from a lack of C2 that is provided by the 
use of an HFN.  A lack of C2, or communications in general, results in wasted resources 
and a delay in relief operations due to confusion or lack of proper information.  The 
government money spent on investment in HFNs can be greatly offset by the potential 
lives saved due to a single HA/DR operation. 
2. What Benefits Can Be Gained By Using The Knowledge Value 
Analysis (KVA) On Hastily-formed Networks (HFNs) In Support Of 
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) Operations? 
Knowledge Value Added (KVA) is a viable tool that can be applied to evaluate a 
process.  By measuring the amount of knowledge required for a process and determining 
the cost of attaining that knowledge, KVA allows you to determine the return on 
knowledge (ROK).  The benefits of KVA are that by comparing processes, both with an 
ROK value, it can demonstrate which produces the greater value.  KVA allows an 
organization to take its processes and measure them in the same way.  By using the input, 
process, output equation, KVA creates a ration of costs and benefits that can be used as a 
guideline for process improvement.  
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Another benefit of KVA is that it can be used to evaluate existing processes or 
options that are being considered.  Once the ROK for the existing process is determined, 
the ROK of any options under consideration can be compared.  If the new options result 
in a better ROK they should be implemented.  The significance of using KVA is that the 
value gained is visible through the ROK. 
3. How Can We Use The Market Comparables Approach To Estimate 
Or Monetize The Revenue Component To A Similar Civilian 
Organization (Western Wild Fires, Hurricane Katrina, Etc.)? 
The Market Comparables approach is a method of determining a value indication 
of a business, by using one or more methods that compare the subject to similar 
businesses, to get a better idea of what the market would pay for the asset(s).110  As 
demonstrated in this research, this methodology was used to estimate or monetize the 
revenue component to two different commercial emergency response activities.  Given a 
major western wildfire scenario, it was learned the government would have to a pay a 
weekly rate of approximately $651K for supplemental firefighting services and assets 
from one private company.  From an actual 2006 FEMA contract, it was learned the 
government is willing to pay a weekly rate of approximately $16.56M for emergency 
transportation services and assets in support of hurricane relief from two private 
companies.   
These two weekly revenues can be compared to the $308K total cost of the 
COASTS Project field experiment, involving setting up and running an HFN at a remote 
location in Thailand.  The factors that should be considered when analyzing the monetary 
value of services and assets are the revenue per unit, the OA coverage and unit of output.  
The following factors were considered and analyzed for this thesis research:  
• The revenue per unit was the government costs for the different 
emergency response services and assets per weekly rate. 
• OA coverage: 
• HFN: 12 km2 remote area. 
• Supplemental firefighters: large-scale wildfire. 
• Emergency medical transport: city of New Orleans and twelve 
coastal Louisiana parishes. 
                                                 
110 International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms, June 2001. 
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• Unit of output: 
• HFN: a mission-critical C2 system, comprised of COTS 
components, that is interoperable with foreign military partners, 
operates in adverse weather and terrain conditions and overcomes 
connectivity issues (bandwidth and technological limitations) with 
foreign C2 assets. 
• Supplemental firefighters: firefighting services supported by 15 
twenty-person crews and three fire engines (each including three-
person crews). 
• Emergency medical transport: medical care and evacuation 
services supported by up to 488 ambulances and para-transit 
vehicles capable of moving nearly 5,400 special need evacuees 
within 72 hours. 
Given these considerations, as well as the level of profile for Hurricane Katrina, the 
government cost for investing in HFNs is considered reasonable in comparison to the two 
Market Comparables and a bargain in comparison to the benefits offered by the C2 
system.   
4. What Are Equivalent Market Comparables For Financial 
Implications To The DOD/NGO HA/DR Functions? 
The guideline business selections for this research were American Medical 
Response Inc. (AMR) and Grayback Forestry (GF).  AMR is the nation’s leading 
commercial provider of medical transportation and GF is an Oregon-based private 
firefighting company.  In lines with the topic of this thesis, both of these profit-driven 
businesses provide emergency response services for natural or man-made disaster 
situations.  Commercial-based HFNs and private firefighting and ambulance services all 
fall under the business of saving lives and providing DoD/NGOs the supplemental 
support necessary during HA/DR operations. 
The concept of HFNs is fairly new and this research is one of the first, if not the 
first, financial analysis’s of HFNs in support of DoD HA/DR operations.  There are 
certainly other equivalent Market Comparables to study in this subject matter and the 
authors encourage further follow-on market comparable research.  To name a few, the 




• News reporting teams 
• Field journalists  
• Hazardous field research (i.e.- Tornado “Chasers”) 
• Surveillance teams 
Another recommended candidate is the farming industry.  Although this business 
is missing the key element of emergency response, the industry is opening its door to 
technological innovations to support their large, remote farmland areas.  In rural Oregon, 
a farming community contracted for IT services to provide one of the largest Wi-Fi mesh 
network clouds in the world, with a coverage of about 700-square-miles that includes the 
city of Hermiston, four counties and a portion of Washington State.111  If the government 
were to invest in HFNs, they would be used in HA/DR operations, where the locations 
tend to be remote like farmlands or devastated by the disaster.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Use of Market Comparables and KVA 
The Market Comparables approach allows the government to better determine the 
value of the advanced C2 capabilities offered by HFNs by comparing the values of other 
emergency response services and assets.  Both the DoD practice of the Market 
Comparables approach and the NPS R&D of HFNs are fairly new.  Further Market 
Comparable research is recommended to give the government a better business 
perspective of the monetary value of HFNs as used in saving lives, establishing crisis 
management control capabilities with multiple response agencies and having immediate 
available assets during HA/DR situations.       
In comparison to the Market Comparable approach, KVA has been a hardened 
financial tool for the DoD.  This methodology has been applied to evaluate several DoD 
processes in order to determine ROK, process improvement guidelines and option 
comparisons.  As further R&D is conducted on HFNs, including future field experiments 
by the COASTS project or by other activities, there may be a need for additional KVA 
analysis on the subject. 
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2. HFNs as a C2 Solution for HA/DR Operations 
The HA/DR efforts during Hurricane Katrina tested the limits of the IT that was 
employed in the disaster response.112  Several months after the storm battered the Gulf 
Coast, emergency managers and IT executives were compiling and pondering the IT 
lessons learned from Katrina.  
When disaster strikes, the response effort relies on an array of IT 
resources. Command and control systems coordinate rescue operations. 
Digital imagery and geographic information systems help provide a 
common operating view of an unfolding situation. Technology also plays 
a role in reporting incidents, delivering supplies and registering 
evacuees… As conventional systems shut down [during Katrina], 
collaboration among emergency response teams, state agencies and federal 
authorities shifted to a number of improvised systems.113 
Furthermore, after 9/11, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
concluded that “a preponderance of evidence indicates that emergency responder lives 
were likely lost at the World Trade Center resulting from the lack of timely information-
sharing…”114  The C2 capabilities provided by an effective HFN could have assisted the 
coordination and collaboration efforts with the various multi-agency response units 
during Katrina and 9/11. 
According to Denning, HFNs offer the ability to form multi-organizational 
networks rapidly that is crucial to large urgent projects and HA/DR efforts in remote or 
devastated locations.115  For this primary reason, as well as all the mentioned benefits 
throughout this thesis, there is a governmental need for a financial analysis on HFNs.  
This research alone cannot answer the many anticipated questions the DoD may have on 
the financial matters of HFN investments.  Analyzing the financial aspects of HFNs is an 
interesting but broad subject area of research.  Many topics from within this thesis 
provide areas for additional research. 
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The authors of this thesis encourage future follow-on research and analysis on the 
financial implications of HFNs in support of HA/DR operations.  Understanding how to 
create, finance and establish HFNs is one of the most challenging parts of modern 
networking.  HFNs are “about how a network, its people and its equipment, may function 
efficiently under extreme stress.”116  This study can provide limited financial and 
technical guidance for those who are in an organization, or one day may be a part of an 
organization, that responds in an HFN.   
3. Implications of Future Research 
Since it is near impossible to anticipate what will happen with HFN technology 
five to ten years from now, the information from this study will need to be revisited 
frequently to guarantee its relevance.  That being said, the following are the authors’ 
recommended future research and follow-on topics that are directed at maintaining the 
relevance of the financial analysis of HFNs:   
• Funding Civil-Military Communication Systems 
• Training the Skill of Improvisation to Support HFNs 
• Financial Analysis of HFNs in HA/DR operations using the Real Options 
Methodology 
• Using HFNs to enhance the C2 capabilities of Military Operations with 
foreign militaries 
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